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Abstract: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision serves as an
international forum to discuss international bank supervision issues.
Because of the gravity and frequency of banking crises since the demise of
the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s, international financial
standards have emerged as a method to minimize these crises. In 1998,
the Basel Committee issued a comprehensive standard on bank super
vision that built upon its work over the previous two and a half decades.
In this Article, the author analyzes this comprehensive standard-the
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision-and assesses its
implementation in the European Union, the United Kingdom, France,
the United States, and the Hong Kong SAR. The author then analyzes the
options available to enforce this "soft law" and comments on the effec
tiveness of these options, including the surveillance programs of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and certain provisions
of the Revised Capital Accord of 2004. Despite the improvements repre
sented by the Core Principles, the author suggests future changes in the
international bank supervisory regime.
INTRODUCTION
Banking is typically one of the most regulated industries within a
nation's economy because it serves as the economy's payment mecha-
nism, gathering financial assets and redeploying them for productive
purposes through loans and other types of credit.' Because banking
and its payment function are so crucial to an economy's operation, na-
tional governments tend to regulate this industry heavily and occasion-
* Head of Reference, Georgetown University Law Library, Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to thank the Van Calker Foundation and the Swiss Institute of Comparative
Law for their generous support of the research for this article, which was principally con-
ducted at the Swiss Institute in Lausanne, Switzerland during the summer of 2004.
1 See Robert E. Krainer, Banking in a Theory of the Business Cycle: A Model and Critique of
the Basle Accord on Risk-Basel Capital Requirements for Banks, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 413,
414 (2001).
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ally even own banks.2 As international trade has grown, each nation's
banking system has likewise become more international. World mer-
chandise trade increased from US$ 579 billion in 1973 to US$ 6,272
billion in 2002.3 International bank loans increased from US$ 2,713.7
billion in 1985 to US$ 20,212.9 billion in 20034-- a 744% increase.
Despite this growth in international banking, national govern-
ments have been very hesitant to enter into international agreements
that involve ceding regulatory control of banks incorporated or oper-
ating within their jurisdictions. National governments tend to view
any transfer of regulatory control over their banking systems as akin
to a surrender of sovereign power.5
National governments generally wish to retain control over bank-
ing systems because of the high costs and negative political repurcus-
sions of bank failures. 6 National governments, and related agencies
such as a central banks, typically have lender of last resort responsibility
for banks operating within their borders. 7 If a bank has insufficient liq-
uid funds to meet payment demands from depositors, the national gov-
ernment, through its central bank, may lend funds to the bank to meet
these demands.8 Furthermore, if a bank becomes insolvent, the na-
tional government can provide funds to the depositors of the failed
bank through a deposit insurance program, allowing depositors to re-
coup losses caused by the insolvency (or a significant portion thereof).9
Several articles have documented the costs of resolving banking crises
as a percentage of the national Gross Domestic Product.10 For example,
the cost of an early 1990s banking crisis in Finland amounted to 11% of
2 See WENDY DOBSON & GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, WORLD CAPITAL MARKETS 95, 103-04
(2001); Richard Dale, International Banking Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MARKET REGULATION 193-94 (Benn Steil ed., 1994); Rolf H. Weber, Challenges for the New
FinancialArchitecure, 31 H.K. L.J. 241, 246 (2001).
3 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, Table 11.2, at 32 (2003),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis-e/its2003e/its2OO3e.pdf.
4 International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS
Q. REv., Mar. 7, 2005, Annex, at A52 tbl.8A, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/
rqa0503.pdf.
5 See Dale, supra note 2, at 187.
6 DOBSON & HUFBAUER, supra note 2, at 101-02.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 102, 106.
'0 MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BANKING STANDARD, at Vii
(1997); see DAVID G. MAYES ET AL., IMPROVING BANKING SUPERVISION 258, 260 (2001). See
generally Huw Ev-ans, International Financial Architecture: Learning the Lessons of History, 2 J.
INT'L FIN. MGMT. 70 (2000).
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its GDP." Likewise, a financial crisis in Mexico from 1994 to 1995 cost
20% of that country's GDP, and a crisis in Thailand in the late 1990s
cost 42% of its GDP. 12 If a systemic financial crisis results from such
bank failures, the associated economic costs can increase exponentially.
Furthermore, a major disruption in the financial system generally leads
to a change in government.
Since the early 1970s national governments have agreed to inter-
national financial standards that set guidelines for best practice in regu-
lating banks and, in particular, internationally active banks. 13 These
standards, however, are not legally enforceable. They are merely soft
law, voluntary guidelines on regulatory and supervisory practices over
the banking industry.14 The most prominent institution issuing these
standards for the banking industry has been the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision ("Basel Committee" or "Committee").
This Article analyzes one of these international financial stan-
dards-the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision ("Core
Principles") 15 and in particular the mechanisms available to enforce
this soft law. The first Section describes the Basel Committee's history
and structure. It analyzes the Basel Committee's earlier pronounce-
ments on bank supervisory practices, particularly those regarding the
coordination of international bank supervision. The second Section
analyzes the implementation of the Core Principles in the national
laws of five important financial markets: the European Union, the
United Kingdom, France, Hong Kong, and the United States. The
third Section discusses the options for enforcement of the Core Prin-
ciples, including key provisions of the recently issued Revised Capital
Accord (or Basel II) that effectively buttress the Core Principles. The
11 GLENN HOGGARTH ET AL., COSTS OF BANKING SYSTEM INSTABILITY: SOME EMPIRI-
CAL EVIDENCE 15 tbl.A (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 144, 2001).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 17 (2001); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, HISTORY OF THE BASEL
COMMITrEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, at http://www.bis.org/pubI/bcbscl01.pdf (Mar. 2004).
14 Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Bask Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking
Supervision, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1998). Soft law is "an international rule created by a
group of specific national authorities and adopted into their nations' laws or administra-
tive codes." Id.
15 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION (1997), reprinted in 37 LL.M. 405, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbscl02.pdf [hereinafter CORE PRINCIPLES].
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final Section forecasts future development in the Core Principles. The
formulation of such developments is an "iterative process."16
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CORE PRINCIPLES
After World War II, the Allied nations created several international
institutions to manage the international financial system ("Bretton
Woods").17 One of the key attributes of the Bretton Woods system was
fixed foreign exchange rates.18 This managed system allowed for
financial stability, but also created economic inefficiencies. In the early
1970s, as the result of several factors, this system of managed foreign
currency rates disintegrated.' 9 Floating currency rates, at least for the
industrialized nations, replaced fixed exchange rates and allowed for
greater efficiencies and greater growth in both international trade and
international finance. 20 Nevertheless, this new, less stable, and more
volatile international financial system was plagued by many more bank
crises than were experienced under the Bretton Woods system. 21
As in other nations, U.S. regulation of foreign banks traditionally
focused on the operations of foreign banks within U.S. borders. 22 Yet,
as financial markets globalized, events in other nations had the poten-
tial to cause dramatic, and sometimes devastating, effects on local
economies. With the globalization of the banking industry, the sys-
temic risk of a financial crisis has increased, but banking regulation
among nations has not developed congruently to meet this greater
risk.23 The Basel Committee, by issuing a series of guidelines for bank
supervision, attempts to rectify this situation.24 The Basel Committee's
16 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY 2 (1999),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs6l.pdf [hereinafter CORE PRINCIPLES METHOD-
OLOGY].
17 See 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 234 (Peter Newman
et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the Bretton Woods system); AXEL A. WEBER, SIXTY YEARS OF
BRETTON WOODS-BACK TO THE FUTURE? 1-3, available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r040806a.pdf (July 23, 2004).
18 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE, supra note 17, at 235.
19 WALKER, supra note 13, at 24-26. See generally RONNIE J. PHILLIPS & RICHARD D.
JOHNSON, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BANKING RELATIONS: HISTORY AND FUTURE PROS-
PECTS (2000) (outlining the history of international banking regulations).
20 WALKER, supra note 13, at 23.
21 See HOGGARTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
22 See generally MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS:
UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL (2003) (discussing governmental control of foreign
banks operating within the United States).
23 SeeDale, supra note 2, at 167-68.
24 See WALKER, supra note 13, at 135-36.
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efforts to harmonize bank regulation have, thus far, culminated with
the issuance of the Core Principles in September 1997.
A. Brief History of the Basel Committee
The 1974 collapse of the Herstatt Bank in Germany and the 1975
failure of Franklin National Bank in the United States led to the crea-
tion of the Basel Committee and the issuance of the Concordat, the
Committe's first agreement on bank supervision.25 The Herstatt Bank
failed due to its fraudulent bookkeeping practices, and other German
banks were unable to rescue it.26 Although legal claims against the Her-
statt Bank were eventually settled, and although mainly domestic assets
were involved,27 the resolution of the bank's failure-particularly the
incomplete satisfaction of foreign creditors' claims-set a negative
precedent for the settlement of international financial crises and dem-
onstrated the need for greater regulatory cooperation with respect to
international banks.28
The Franklin National Bank ("Franklin") failure demonstrated
how the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system left banks more
exposed to currency rate risk.2 Franklin, at the time the twentieth
largest bank in the United States, closed in 1974.30 Although weak
management and a large amount of non-performing loans contrib-
uted to the bank's failure, Franklin's collapse occured largely because
25 See generally COMM. ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, Concor-
dat on Supervison of Banks 'Foreign Establishments, in IMF, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SHORT TERM PROSPECTS 29-32 (Occasional Paper No. 7,
1981) [hereinafter CONCORDAT]. The original Concordat was not released to the public
until March 1981. Id. at 29. The original name of the Basel Committee was the Committee
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS, supra
note 13.
26 See Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano Collapse and the Luxury of National Lenders of
Last Resort with International Responsibilities, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 181, 186-87
(1990). In addition, the London branch of the Franklin National Bank suffered severe
losses in the early 1970s, for which the Federal Reserve compensated with liquidity sup-
port. Franklin National Bank eventually failed anyway, illustrating the confusion of super-
visory responsibilities over international banks. See generally Joseph D. Becker, International
Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A.J. 1290 (1976) (giving full account of the Herstatt
failure).
27 Hess, supra note 26, at 186. West German banks received 45%, foreign banks re-
ceived 55%, and other creditors received 65% of their respective claims. Id.
28 Id.
29 WALKER, supra note 13, at 25.
3 Id. at 26-27.
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of foreign exchange trading losses that prompted institutional deposi-
tors to withdraw their funds.31
The Basel Committee was organized in 1975 in direct response to
the Herstatt Bank and Franklin failures. 32 The Committee's members
consist of banking regulators from Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 33 The Basel
Committee secretariat is located at the offices of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.34 Although some observers
have criticized the Committee for its lack of members from emerging
markets, 35 its pronouncements have regularly included consultations
with regulators from emerging markets and transition economies. 36
The purpose of the Basel Committee is to provide "regular co-
operation between its member countries on banking supervisory mat-
ters."37 The Committee seeks to harmonize the banking laws of vari-
ous nations indirectly through the issuance of guidelines developed
by consensus among its members. 38 The discussions held by the Basel
Committee are confidential, and the Committee does not publish
31 Id. at 27-28.
32 RICHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 172 (1984); Ethan B.
Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations,
43 INT'L ORG. 323, 328-29 (1989). For a detailed discussion on the Basel Committee, see
WALKER, supra note 13, at 17-162 (2001).
33 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 13. See generally Marilyn B. Cane & David
A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the International Arena, 13 B.C. INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 273, 319 n.321 (1990) (providing background on the Bank for International
Settlements and the Committee).
34 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 74TH ANNUAL REPORT 157 (2004). Two deputy direc-
tors are permanent staff at the Bank for International Settlements. The remaining profes-
sional staff of the Basel Committee are on loan from member nations. See The Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2005).
5 See, e.g., HOWARD DAVIES, Is THE GLOBAL REGULATORY SYSTEM FIT FOR PURPOSE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY? 5-7, available at http://www.bis.org/review/r030606g.pdf (May 20,
2003).
36 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1-2. The Basel Committee was very influential in
the creation of regional bank supervisory groups such as the Offshore Group of Banking
Supervisors. These groups serve as forums for the Basel Committee to communicate
efficiently with its peers in emerging markets. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-
orgpages/org-ogbs-en.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
37 Peter Cooke, The Basle "Concordat" on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 39
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 151, 151 (1984).
38 See id.
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minutes.3 9 The Committee does, however, publish its findings, and
recent standards have involved much more consultation with non-
member regulatory authorities, as well as the financial services indus-
try and the general public.4° While the Committee has no legal en-
forcement power itself, it encourages member nations to abide by
these regulatory guidelines and to use whatever authority they possess
to enact and enforce them.4' Typically, the Basel Committee standards
are endorsed at the biennial meeting of the International Conference
of Banking Supervisors. 42 The Committee has issued several guide-
lines on international banking supervision: the Concordat of 1975
("Concordat); 43 the Revised Concordat; 44 the Capital Adequacy
Standards ("Basel I"), 45 the Minimum Standards for the Supervision
of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establish-
ments ("Minimum Standards"),46 the Core Principles, 47 and, most re-
39 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 13. The Basel Committee used to keep
minutes of its meetings. Currently, the Committee keeps a detailed action plan as the only
written record of its meetings. These documents are for internal use only and are not
available to the public. See Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 945, 964
(2004).
40 See, e.g., CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1. Prior to completing the final document,
the Basel Committee issued three separate consultative papers and three quantitative impact
studies and reviewed hundreds of comments from the financial services industry and the gen-
eral public. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 1 (Basel Comm.
Publ'n No. 107, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf.
41 See CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 2.
42 Te International Conference of Banking Supervisors is a biennial conference of bank
supervisors from around the world. Sponsored by the Basel Committee, the latest conference
was held in Madrid, Spain, in September 2004. See Global Bank Regulators Mull New Rules Re-
unite, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 21, 2004, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/040921/137/2g77g.html;
Top Bank Regulator Urges Closer Cross-border Work, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 22, 2004, at 1.
43 CONCORDAT, supra note 25.
44 COMM. ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REVISED BASLE
CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS,
22 I.L.M. 900, 901 (1983) [hereinafter REVISED CONCORDAT].
45 COMM. ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS, in 51 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 143 (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbscl11.pdf [hereinafter CAPI-
TAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS]. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International
CapitalAdequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK.J. INT'L
L. 189 (1992) (analyzing the Capital Adequacy Standards and their impact on the banking
industry).
46 BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS (1992),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS].
47 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15.
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cently, the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework ("Revised Capital Accord" or
"Basel II").48 Appendix A contains a brief timeline of the Basel Com-
mittee's principal standards. The Core Principles and their enforce-
ability are the main focus of this Article.
B. The Concordat of 1975
As a result of the Herstatt Bank failure and the subsequent con-
fusion over the settlement of the bank's liabilities, the Committee
sought to establish an agreement on the respective roles of home
country supervisors to ensure supervision over all international
financial institutions.49 The Committee attempted to fulfill this task by
issuing the Concordat, which delineated the supervisory responsibili-
ties of home and host country regulators over international banks.50
By entitling the document a "concordat," the Committee indicated
that the agreement was not a binding treaty,51 but instead a set of
guidelines on bank supervision, adopted by consensus among Basel
Committee members.52
The objectives of the Concordat were to ensure the adequate
regulation of foreign banks and the prevention of foreign banks from
escaping supervision. 53 A central tenet of the Concordat was joint re-
sponsibility between home and host countries in regulating interna-
tional banks.54
48 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.htm [hereinafter REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD].
49 Richard Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, FIN. TIMES LONDON,July 22, 1991, at 12.
50 The home or parent regulator is responsible for supervision in the country where
the "parent bank" is headquartered and licensed. See CONCORDAT, supra note 25, at 30.
The host regulator is responsible for supervision in the foreign country where the "parent
bank" is operating an establishment. See id.
51 M.S. Mendelsohn, New Basel Concordat: Main Deficiency Is Intact, Am. BANKER, June 16,
1983, at 2.
52 See id. The word "concordat" refers to a "public act of agreement" (as opposed to a
.contract" between private parties). Id.
53 CONCORDAT, supra note 25, at 29-30; see Cane & Barclay, supra note 33, at 321.
54 DALE, supra note 32, at 12. The Concordat set forth five principles:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint
responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each
country should ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised,
and supervision should be adequate as judged by both host and parent au-
thorities.
[Vol. 28:237
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The Concordat dealt primarily with the liquidity, solvency, and for-
eign exchange operations of foreign banks.55 The host supervisory
authority was responsible for regulating liquidity, regardless of the type
of banking entity established in the host nation. 56 The Concordat allo-
cated responsibility for solvency between host and home regulators de-
pending on the type of foreign banking establishment involved; sub-
sidiaries and joint ventures were the responsibility of the host regulator,
while branches were the responsibility of the home regulator.5 7
The Concordat had several weaknesses. First, despite its attempts
to allocate supervisory responsibility, it still left unclear which regulator
should act to contain a major bank failure. 58 Also, designation of the
host supervisor as the primary solvency regulator of foreign bank sub-
sidiaries ran contrary to the system of consolidated supervision used in
most industrialized nations.59 The allocations of responsibility in the
Concordat presented a risk that host regulators, following consolidated
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of
host authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to lo-
cal practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local regu-
lations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary re-
sponsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take ac-
count of the exposure of their domestic banks' moral commitment in this re-
gard.
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of information
between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for in-
spections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host
authority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (particu-
larly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which might
hinder these forms of cooperation.
W. Peter Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organiztions: Evolving Techniques for Coop-
eration Among Supervisory Authorities, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 244, 246 (1981); see
also Richard Dale, Basle Concordat: Lessons from Ambrosiano, THE BANKER, Sept. 1983, at 55
(summarizing the Concordat).
55 See CONCORDAT, supra note 25, at 29.
56 See id. at 30. Liquidity is a measure of a bank's ability to convert assets to cash or
cash-equivalents without diminution of the assets' value. JERRY M. ROSENBERG, DICTION-
ARY OF BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES 415 (1985).
57 CONCORDAT, supra note 25, at 30-31. Solvency is a measure of a bank's ability to
generate cash flow sufficient to satisfy its liabilities as they mature and to provide an ade-
quate return to its shareholders. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (8th ed. 2004).
58 See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of
Banking Regulations, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 330 (1989).
59 DALE, supra note 32, at 173. Under consolidated supervision, responsibility for regu-
lating a bank's foreign subsidiaries is shared between host and parent regulators, with the
parent supervisor considering all of the assets and liabilities of the bank, wherever located,
in order to determine the bank's overall solvency. See id. at 176.
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supervision, would look to parent supervisors to regulate a bank sub-
sidiary's solvency, while parent regulators, relying upon language in the
Concordat, would look to the host supervisor to perform this task.60
Finally, the Concordat lacked specific supervisory standards for
Committee members to employ,61 allowing individual nations to in-
terpret the Concordat in inconsistent manners. 62 The most important
and potentially dangerous interpretation involved the mistaken belief
that lender of last resort responsibility accompanied supervisory re-
sponsibility.63 The Committee never intended the Concordat to deal
with lender of last resort responsibility."
The 1982 financial collapse of the Luxembourg subsidiary of
Banco Ambrosiano, the largest Italian bank at the time, highlighted
the weaknesses of the Concordat. The Luxembourg subsidiary had
made US$ 1.4 billion worth of imprudent loans to Latin American
companies. 65 Concurrently, the subsidiary owed nearly US$ 450 mil-
lion to other creditors. 66 Unable to pay its creditors, Banco Ambro-
siano and its Luxembourg subsidiary collapsed.67
60 Id. at 173. The "primary motivation" for drafting the Revised Concordat, adopted in
1983, was to "incorporate understandings on applying the principle of consolidated super-
vision to banks' international business." Cooke, supra note 37, at 152-53.
61 DALE, supra note 32, at 173.
62 In 1979, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") proposed that U.S. offices of foreign
banks report on the structure and condition of their parent banks to the FRB, but regula-
tors in other nations thought this requirement would violate provisions of the Concordat.
Id. The Federal Reserve eventually received power to enforce such a reporting require-
ment under the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act. Id. On another occasion, the
FRB was faced with a three-way international disagreement as to the Concordat's meaning.
Id. Swiss regulators believed that host regulators had primary responsibility for regulating
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. Id. In contrast, regulators in Great Britain be-
lieved that host regulators were responsible for supervising only foreign bank subsidiaries.
Id. Bank regulators in the Netherlands, in yet another interpretation, believed that the
parent regulator was responsible for the supervision of its subsidiaries. Id. at 173-74.
63 Id. at 174. "Lender of last resort responsibility" refers to the obligation of a central
bank or regulator to provide as much liquidity as necessary to a bank in order to meet its
obligations to depositors and creditors. Id.
64 See Cooke, supra note 37, at 153-54. The Concordat is silent on this point. See id.
6 SeeHess, supra note 26, at 188-89, 191.
66 Id. at 190.
67 See Hess, supra note 26, at 189-90; RonnieJ. Phillips & Richard D.Johnson, Regulat-
ing International Banking: Rationale, History and Prospects, in THE NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITEC-
TURE: INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1-22 (Benton E. Gup
ed., 2000).
[N761. 28:237
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Neither the Luxembourg nor the Italian regulators claimed su-
pervisory or lender of last resort responsibility for the bank.68 The
Italian regulators argued that they lacked the legal authority to regu-
late the Luxembourg subsidiary and bore little or no responsibility for
its failure.6 9 Italian regulators pointed to the way that their previous
attempts to examine Banco Ambrosiano's South American offices
were rebuffed by local regulators as proof of their inability to regulate
Banco Ambrosiano's foreign subsidiaries. Italian regulators argued
that they would not take responsibility for the failure of a bank they
were not permitted to supervise properly.70 Luxembourg regulators,
on the other hand, ignored Italian requests to tighten their supervi-
sion of the Banco Ambrosiano subsidiary, believing that a subsidiary
operating under the same name as its parent bank (as was the case
with the Luxembourg subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano) should have
been supported either by the parent bank or indirectly by the central
bank in the parent bank's home country.71 Thus, Luxembourg regula-
tors believed that the Banco Ambrosiano parent bank or the Italian
central bank should have supported the Luxembourg subsidiary.72
C. The Revised Concordat of 1983
The Committee responded to the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano
by issuing the Revised Concordat in 1983. 73 The Revised Concordat
was not an entirely new agreement, rather it built upon the original
Concordat.74 Like its predecessor, it was a non-binding agreement that
embodied "recommended guidelines of best practices." 75 Under the
68 DALE, supra note 32, at 175; see MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, FINANCIAL DEREGULATION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 202 n.32 (1987) (describ-
ing the Banco Ambrosiano collapse and its resolution).
69 DALE, supra note 32, at 175; Hess, supra note 26, at 192.
70 Hess, supra note 26, at 192-93.
71 See DALE, supra note 32, at 175; Dale, supra note 54, at 57. The turmoil resulting
from Banco Ambrosiano's failure ended when two settlement agreements were signed: the
first between the liquidators of Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Luxembourg
holding company (and its foreign subsidiaries); and the second between the creditors of
Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Vatican bank. Hess, supra note 26, at 194-95.
In the aftermath of the Banco Ambrosiano affair, the Italian Parliament passed a law that
required disclosure of the shareholder structure of banks and also passed enabling legisla-
tion for the 1983 European Union Council Directive on Supervision. Id. at 199.
72 Hess, supra note 26, at 191.
7 3 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 901; see Dale, supra note 49, at 12.
74 See HALL, supra note 68, at 166; Cooke, supra note 37, at 152-53; see also REVISED
CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 901 (using the original Concordat as a foundation).
75 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 901.
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Revised Concordat, nations still retained authority to license banks
with few restrictions-even banks they were unable to regulate effec-
tively.76 Furthermore, it provided no incentive for compliance with its
provisions other than the political pressure that bank regulators could
exercise on their recalcitrant colleagues.77 Nevertheless, with the Re-
vised Concordat, the Committee attempted to close the supervisory
gaps that existed under the original Concordat and directly address
the adequacy of foreign bank regulation.
1. "Dual Key" Supervision
As with the original Concordat, a primary objective of the Re-
vised Concordat was to ensure that no foreign bank escaped supervi-
sion, and that each establishment was supervised adequately.78 The
Revised Concordat introduced a "dual key" approach whereby both
home and host supervisory authorities assessed the quality of the
other's supervision of an internationally active bank.79 The host juris-
diction had to be satisfied with the supervision over the parent bank
within its home jurisdiction; likewise, the parent bank's home jurisdic-
tion had to be satisfied that the foreign operations of its domestic
banks were supervised adequately by the host regulators.8°
If the host regulator considered the parent regulator's supervi-
sion insufficient, the host regulator had the right to discourage or
prohibit the foreign bank from operating within its jurisdiction or to
set stringent conditions for the bank's continued operation therein.81
Likewise, the parent regulator could attempt to extend its jurisdic-
tional reach if it did not believe that the host regulator was providing
adequate supervision.82 Alternatively, it could discourage or prohibit
the parent bank from operating in the host nation. 83 Using this "dual
76 See Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2 (criticizing the Basel Committee for repeating
its failure to address lender of last resort responsibility in the Revised Concordat).
77 See id. (noting that the Revised Concordat remained "no more than an informal
agreement").
7 8 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903; see Dale, supra note 2, at 169.
79 See Dale, supra note 49, at 12.
8 Id.; see REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903-04. The "dual key" approach is
highly dependent on effective communication and active cooperation among host and
parent regulators. See Dale, supra note 49, at 12.
81 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903-04; DALE, supra note 32, at 175. This
provision was a concession to U.S. regulatory authorities, whose previous attempts to
monitor the status of foreign parent banks with U.S. offices were met with strong resistance
from foreign supervisory authorities. Id.
8 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903; see Hess, supra note 26, at 200.
8 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903; see Hess, supra note 26, at 200.
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key" approach, the Committee intended to prevent a "race to the bot-
tom--the tendency for jurisdictions to relax financial regulation and
supervision in order to attract more foreign investment8 4
In the Banco Ambrosiano case, no regulator took responsibility
for the supervision of the Luxembourg-based bank.s5 If the Revised
Concordat principles had been applied to the Banco Ambrosiano
situation, Luxembourg would have had primary responsibility to su-
pervise the subsidiary, but if the parent regulator (Italy) had not been
satisfied with that supervision, it could have provided its own supervi-
sion.86 The "dual key" system in the Revised Concordat was designed
to encourage nations to make their bank supervision practices equiva-
lent to those present in the most stringently regulated financial cen-
ters.87 Such convergence, however, required bank regulators to pro-
hibit weakly regulated banks from operating within their jurisdiction
and to prevent their own adequately regulated banks from expanding
into inadequately regulated jurisdictions. 88 The first scenario would
result in the loss of foreign investment, the second in forgone inter-
national business opportunities.
The Revised Concordat allocated supervisory responsibility be-
tween host and parent regulators based on both the nature of the
regulatory objective (e.g., liquidity, solvency) and the type of banking
establishment.s9 The Revised Concordat describes three types of for-
eign banking establishments: branches, subsidiaries, and joint ven-
tures or consortia.90
The responsibility for foreign bank solvency depended on the
type of bank establishment. The parent supervisor was responsible for
regulating branch solvency because the branch was still legally a part
84 Dale, supra note 49, at 12.
8 DALE, supra note 32, at 175.
86 See REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 903. The Revised Concordat calls for a
concerned parent regulator to extend its supervision in such a manner "to the degree that
it is practicable." Id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See HALL, supra note 68, at 166-68 (providing a succinct summary of the Revised
Concordat).
90 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 902. A branch does not have a separate legal
status from the parent bank. Id. A subsidiary is a legally independent entity that is wholly-
owned or majority-owned by the parent bank. Id. Joint ventures or consortia are "legally
independent institutions incorporated in the country where their principal operations are
conducted and controlled by two or more parent institutions, most of which are usually
foreign and not all of which are necessarily banks." Id.; see Hal S. Scott, Supervision of Inter-
national Banking: Post-BCC, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 487-510 (1992).
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of the parent bank.91 Parent and host supervisors had joint responsi-
bility for subsidiaries. 92 The host supervisor had some responsibility
because the subsidiary was a legally independent institution; the par-
ent supervisor had responsibility because of the principle of consoli-
dated supervision (described below) and the effect of the subsidiary's
activities on the overall financial status of the parent bank.93 Supervi-
sion over the solvency of joint ventures was primarily the responsibility
of the regulator in the joint venture's country of incorporation. 94
Under the Revised Concordat, liquidity referred to the ability of a
foreign bank to meet its obligations as they fell due; it did not refer to
lender of last resort responsibilities. 95 Host regulators were primarily
responsible for supervising the liquidity of branches and subsidiar-
ies. 96 Parent regulators could also be concerned with liquidity, be-
cause branches may call upon the resources of the parent bank and
the parent bank may issue comfort letters or other standby credit in-
struments to its subsidiaries. 97 For joint ventures, the country of in-
corporation had primary responsibility over liquidity.98
2. Consolidated Supervision
In addition to the concept of "dual key" supervision, the Revised
Concordat adopted the principle of consolidated supervision. Under
this principle, the parent supervisor monitored a parent bank's risk
exposure and capital adequacy based on all the operations of the bank,
wherever conducted.9 The Basel Committee acknowledged that adop-
tion of this concept might extend the traditional jurisdictional limits of
a parent regulator's supervisory responsibility.10 0
In April 1990, the Basel Committee issued a paper discussing the
exchange of information among bank supervisors as a supplement to
91 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 905
9Id. at 906.
93 Id. This provision differs from the original 1975 Concordat, where supervision of a
subsidiary's solvency was primarily the responsibility of the host regulator. See CONCORDAT,
supra note 25, at 31-32.
9 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 906-07.
9 Id. at 906.
96 Id. at 907.
97 See id.
98 Id.
9 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 905; see DALE, supra note 32, at 176.
100 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 905.
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the Revised Concordat. 101 In this paper, the Committee stressed its
concern over the prohibition against sharing certain information with
supervisors in certain countries.10 2 The Committee then set forth its
view as to the best practice for sharing prudential information. 03 The
Committee stressed that information received under agreements be-
tween prudential supervisors was to be be used for supervisory pur-
poses only, and that the confidentiality of the information provided
must be assured.104 If the recipient authority wished to take action
based on information received, it first should consult with the sending
authority.10 5 The statement sought to outline arrangements that
would allow for the greatest possible flow of relevant information
among bank supervisors. 10 6 Only through trust and shared informa-
tion would bank supervisors be able to monitor international bank
operations effectively.107
3. Weaknesses of the Revised Concordat
Nevertheless, the Revised Concordat, like its predecessor, also
contained some weaknesses. Its explicit refusal to address the issue of
lender of last resort responsibility presented one major weakness. 08
Theoretically, if banking regulators cooperate to prevent bank fail-
ures, they should also cooperate in upholding the international bank-
ing system when a failure is imminent.10 9 The Committee did not ad-
dress lender of last resort responsibility because some members of the
Committee were not central banks and thus lacked any lending power
with which to support failing banks.110 More fundamentally, the
Committee avoided the issue because the central banks of the indus-
trialized nations had stated vaguely that they would support the li-
101 See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN BANKING AND SECURITIES SUPERVISORS (Apr. 1990), available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs07a.pdf [hereinafter EXCHANGE DOCUMENT] (supplementing the Revised
Concordat).
102 Id. at 2-3.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 5.
106 EXCHANGE DOCUMENT, supra note 101, at 2.
107 See id. at 3.
108 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 901 (stating that it does not address lender
of last resort responsibility); see Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2.
109 David W. Wise, International Prudential Regulation of Commercial Banks, BANK ADMIN.,
June 1985, at 58, 62 (stating "Ulust as laws should provide for their own enforcement,
supervision should provide for the eventuality that such supervision can fail").
110 Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2.
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quidity of the international markets in times of crisis."' In drafting
the Revised Concordat, the central bankers sought to leave this prior
commitment vague in order to encourage private sector discipline
and minimize moral hazard.112 The central bankers hoped to create a
delicate balance between creating confidence in financial markets
and discouraging reckless behavior by financial institutions.
1 3
The Revised Concordat purposely blurred host and parent regu-
latory responsibilities in order to avoid the type of finger-pointing that
occurred among regulators after the Banco Ambrosiano failure." 4 In
doing so, however, it also created problems of overlapping authority
and responsibility in cases where one regulator was designated the
primary regulator, but another also had a strong interest in maintain-
ing effective supervision over a foreign bank." 5 This overlap created
uncertainty for regulators with respect to their supervisory responsi-
bilities.1 16 In theory, the parent regulator should have ultimate re-
sponsibility for the safety and soundness of its banks in all of their
forms and establishments, foreign and domestic." 7 The principle of
consolidated supervision allows a parent regulator, in the course of
enforcing its own regulations, to approve or disapprove of its banks'
foreign operation.118 Nevertheless, despite significant improvements
over the original Concordat, the Revised Concordat still left gaps in
the coordination of international bank regulations.
The difficulty of implementing consolidated supervision seemed
evident from the drafters' treatment of international bank holding
companies." 9 The Revised Concordat designated the host regulator
(rather than the parent regulator) as the primary supervisor of subsidi-
ary banks controlled by a bank holding company, but failed to desig-
I See id. (noting statement of support of Euromarkets still applies).
112 Id. "Moral hazard" refers to the economic concept whereby an economic actor will
pursue risky behavior that it otherwise would not have because of an external subsidy. See
Hidden Actions, Moral Hazard and Contract Theory, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY ANt FINANCE 304 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992).
113 See Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2.
114 Wise, supra note 109, at 62.
115 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 906 (stating that the countries in which joint
ventures are incorporated (host countries) have primary responsibility for supervising the
joint venture, but that the parent regulators of banks that are shareholders in the joint
venture cannot ignore supervision of the joint venture).
116 Wise, supra note 109, at 62.
117 Id.
118 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 906.
119 See id. at 904.
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nate a primary regulator of the bank holding company itself.120 This
omission would prove to be a very significant gap-one that the Bank
of Commerce and Credit International ("BCCI") would later exploit.121
As banks expanded into new and different lines of business, they
tended to develop complex holding company structures. These at-
tenuated and far-flung corporate structures, such as the one main-
tained by Banco Ambrosiano, often allowed banks to escape effective
regulation. 122 Under the Revised Concordat, a holding company with
independent banks operating in different countries could avoid
meaningful consolidated supervision because no one regulator had
responsibility for the holding company's overall financial strength. 123
Likewise, effective supervision of a holding company with both bank
and non-bank subsidiaries required the cooperation of multiple regu-
lators that differed not only by geography, but also by function (insur-
ance, securities, banking).124
In the 1980s, BCCI likewise took advantage of a fragmented cor-
porate structure in order to avoid comprehensive regulation. 25 In a
coordinated action on July 5, 1991, regulators in eight nations closed
all the BCCI branches located within their jurisdictions. 2 6 At the time,
BCCI had total assets of approximately US$ 20 billion and was operat-
ing in sixty-nine countries, with the largest concentration of its depos-
its in the United Kingdom. 127 Due to the absence of any international
120 See id.
121 See Dale, supra note 49, at 12 (pointing out that BCCI's structure was such that it
could avoid stringent consolidated supervision under the Revised Concordat).
122 Banco Ambrosiano consisted of a parent bank in Italy and several foreign subsidiar-
ies, including banks located in Peru, Panama, and Luxembourg. See Hess, supra note 26, at
189-90. The Luxembourg subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Holding, itself had a Bahamian
subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Ltd. See id. at 190.
12 3 REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 44, at 904.
124 See id.
125 See David Lascelles, First Step Towards Tougher Regulation, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept.
2, 1991, at 13.
126 Max Hall, The BCCIAffair BANKING WORLD, Sept. 1991, at 8. The eight nations were
the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Id. Indeed, on that day, action to shut down BCCI's activities
was taken in more than sixty nations. Id. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basic Committee
Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEo. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & EcoN. 241 (1992) (describing the failure of the international bank BCCI and
the complex, coordinated action by bank regulators to minimize depositors' losses).
127 Statement byJ. Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, William Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision
and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and E. Gerald Corri-
gan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 13, 1991, in 77 FED. RES.
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law governing international bank closures, local regulators acted un-
der separate national laws.' 28 The closure of BCCI branches contin-
ued for several weeks and, by July 29, 1991, forty-four jurisdictions had
closed BCCI offices located within their borders.19
The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the massive
fraud committed by BCCI's senior managers.130 Through the mid-
1980s, the treasury operations of BCCI suffered huge losses, and sen-
ior managers siphoned off deposits to cover them.' 13 If the depositors
withdrew their money, then other deposits were diverted to cover the
losses. This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent trans-
actions. 13 2 Senior managers, board members, and representatives of
major shareholders participated in the fraud by making fictitious
loans, failing to record deposits, and dealing in their own shares in
order to manufacture profits.133 BCCI also used client names to trade
on its own account.5 4 BCCI managers hid the losses caused by bad
trades, unpaid loans, and fraudulent practices by shuttling assets be-
tween subsidiaries.135
BULL. 902, 905 (1991) [hereinafter Mattingly Statement]. BCCI was no longer accepting
retail deposits in its U.S. offices because of actions taken previously by U.S. bank regula-
tors. Id. at 907.
128 Cf. Claire Makin, Learning from BCCI, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 93,
94-95 (discussing various local investigations into BCCI and the lack of overall interna-
tional accountability). In a 1989 interview, former BCCI chief executive Swaleh Naqvi ac-
knowledged that "[because we do not have a dominant presence in any single country,
the full impact of what we are doing is not visible." Id. at 94.
129 Mattingly Statement, supra note 127, at 908.
130 Hall, supra note 126, at 8. The Bank of England had commissioned Price Water-
house to investigate BCCI and issue a report under section 41 of the 1987 Banking Act,
which permits the investigation of banks on behalf of depositors. Banking Act, 1987, ch.
22, § 41.
131 David Lascelles, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, FIN. TIMES(London), Oct. 22, 1991,
at 32. There are estimates that BCCI raised over US$ 600 million in unrecorded deposits.
All Things to All Men, EcONOMIST,July 27, 1991, at 67-68.
132 Lascelles, supra note 131, at 32.
133 Hall, supra note 126, at 8. For example, BCCI reported loans of US$ 445 million to
Ghaith Pharaon, a Saudi business executive, and US$ 796 million to the Gokal family in
Pakistan; both borrowers were shareholders of First American Bankshares, which was se-
cretly owned by BCCI. These loans were not secured with any assets, nor were they in fact
made to the named individuals. SeeJonathan Friedland, Rest in Pieces, FAR E. EcON. REv.,
Sept. 26, 1991, at 64, 66. See generallyJAMES RING ADAMS & DOUGLAS FRANTZ, A FULL SERV-
ICE BANK: How BCCI STOLE BILLIONS AROUND THE WORLD (1992) (chronicling the BCCI
affair).
13 All Things to All Men, supra note 131, at 67.
135 The Many Facades of BCCI, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 81. In addition, Price Wa-
terhouse discovered a secret "bank within a bank," controlled by top BCCI officials, which
hid losses and plugged holes in the balance sheets by raising deposits without recording
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The BCCI affair was "a case of systematic and deliberate criminal
fraud ... [in which] BCCI took maximum advantage of an unsuper-
vised cooperate [sic] structure to conceal and warehouse in bank se-
crecy jurisdictions billions of dollars in fraudulent transactions."136
BCCI was able to take advantage of technological advances that al-
lowed it to shift funds world-wide very quickly. The BCCI scandal illus-
trates that, as the banking industry becomes global, the potential for
global fraud or mismanagement grows concurrently.
The circumstances surrounding the closure of BCCI called into
question the "adequacy of international supervisory arrangements." 3
7
The Basel Committee began discussions of the ramifications of the
BCCI closure almost immediately. 38 In light of BCCI, the Committee
members generally agreed that there was a need to strengthen the
provisions of the Revised Concordat. t3 9 To this end, in July 1992 the
Committee issued the Minimum Standards.140
D. Minimum Standards
In the Minimum Standards, the Committee tightened its position
on international bank supervision' 4' and strengthened the principles
reflected in the Concordat and the Revised Concordat. 142 The Mini-
mum Standards stated that: (1) all international banks and banking
groups should be supervised by home country regulators; (2) interna-
tional banks should obtain permission from both the host and home
country regulators before opening branches or other banking estab-
lishments in foreign nations; (3) banking regulators should have the
right to gather information from international banks; (4) host regula-
tors can impose restrictive measures against the international banks if
the Minimum Standards are not met; and (5) encouragement of in-
them. Id. In 1988 alone, BCCI subsidiaries paid each other US$ 152 million in fee income.
Id.
136 Mattingly Statement, supra note 127, at 905.
137 Hall, supra note 126, at 8.
138 The new Minimum Standards were issued in July 1992, only a year after BCCI was
completely closed. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46. The drafters somewhat crypti-
cally noted that they began their work on the standards "[flollowing recent develop-
ments." Id. at 1.
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 See Steven Prokesch, Regulators Agree on Rules to Prevent More B.C.C.I. 's, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1992, at DI.
142MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 1. The 1990 Supplement to the Revised
Concordat concerning "Information Flows Between Banking Supervisory Authorities" was
not made part of the Minimum Standards. See id. at 1-2.
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formation exchanges between regulators in different nations should
continue.143
1. Consolidated Supervision Redux
The Minimum Standards stated that all international banks
should be subject to consolidated supervision by their home country
regulators.14 This required that the home country regulator receive
reliable information on the global operations of the particular inter-
national bank.1 45 Supervisors then would assess this information in
monitoring the safety and soundness of international banks.146 Under
the Minimum Standards, home country bank regulators could pre-
vent the creation of corporate affiliations that undermined the appli-
cation of consolidated supervision or hindered effective regulation,
147
and also could prevent the opening of banking establishments in for-
eign jurisdictions if they were not satisfied with the host country su-
pervision. 148
Host country regulators likewise had the responsibility to ensure
that the home country regulators had the ability to meet these stan-
dards. 149 The Minimum Standards required that international banks
receive permission from both home and host country regulators be-
fore opening cross-border banking establishments. 150 The approval of
any new banking establishment was contingent upon a multilateral
agreement among regulators allowing each to gather the information
necessary for effective supervision. 151
The Minimum Standards allocated supervisory responsibilities
between home and host country regulators in a similar manner as the
Revised Concordat, except in cases where the regulators decide that
that allocation is inappropriate. 52 If, in a particular situation, one
143 International Panel on Banking Revises Minimum StandardsWALL ST. J., July 7, 1992, at
C25. The Minimum Standards use the terms "home-country" and "host-country" in lieu of
"parent" and "host." See generally MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46.




148 See id. at 3-4.
149. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 2.
150 Id. at 3. In determining whether to approve a foreign operation, the host-country
regulator can consider the bank's strength of capital, organization, and operating proce-
dures for risk management. The home-country regulator, of course, should consider the
same factors. Id. at 4.
151 Id. at 4-5.
152 Id.
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regulator determined that such allocation was inappropriate, then it
could reach an explicit agreement with its counterpart on a more ap-
propriate allocation of supervisory responsibility.153 In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, the Minimum Standards continued to
allocate supervisory responsibilities. 154
The host country regulator had responsibility for determining
whether the international bank in fact would be subject to consoli-
dated supervision in the home country.155 If the host country regula-
tor found that the bank was not receiving effective supervision from
the home country regulator, the host country regulator could prevent
the opening of the new banking establishment. 156 Alternatively, in its
sole discretion, the host country regulator could allow the establish-
ment of branches subject to any regulatory restrictions it deemed
necessary and appropriate, 157 but then would have to supervise any
such establishment on a" 'stand alone' consolidated basis."158
In a statement accompanying the issuance of the Minimum Stan-
dards, the Committee stated, "the minimum standards are designed
to provide greater assurances that in the future no international bank
can operate without being subject to effective, consolidated supervi-
sion."159 The Minimum Standards themselves made clear that con-
solidated supervision is a fundamental regulatory principle adopted
by the international bank supervisory community.16°
The new standards required that a single bank regulator exercise
primary regulatory authority over an international bank.161 The
minimum standards make home country regulators the primary regu-
153 See id. at 5.
154 Id. at 5-6.
15 See id. at 6. The host regulator should consider whether the bank is incorporated in
a nation with which the host regulator has a mutual understanding for the exchange of
information; whether the home-country regulator has given its consent for the new bank-
ing establishment; and whether the home-country regulator has the capability to perform
consolidated supervision. Id. at 5-6.
156 Id. This course of action is not necessary if the home-country regulators are willing
and able to "initiate the effort to take measures to meet these standards." Id.
157 MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 6.
158 Id. at 7.
159 Maggie Fox, Watchdog Writes Standards to Stop BCCI-type Frauds, REUTER BUS. REP.,
July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
160 MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 2.
161 This prevents any sort of collegial regulatory arrangement, similar to the one that
attempted to supervise BCCI for several years. Learning from BCCI, FIN. TIMES LONDON,
July 7, 1992, at 18. Specifically, the Minimum Standards state that all international banks
.should be supervised by a home-country authority that capably performs consolidated
supervision." MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 3.
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lator of the foreign banking operations of banks incorporated in their
jurisdictions.162
The most important change in the new standards was formaliza-
tion of the requirement that international banks receive permission
from both home and host country regulators before opening foreign
banking establishments. 163 This double approval was designed to pre-
vent the finger-pointing that had occurred in the past after a bank
failure. 164
2. Gaps and Weaknesses in the Minimum Standards
Despite their improvements over past guidelines, the Minimum
Standards contained a gap that banks could exploit to avoid regula-
tion. A host regulator could still choose to allow a foreign banking
establishment to operate in its jurisdiction even if the establishment's
home regulator did not comply with the Minimum Standards. 165 The
host country regulator need only impose the restrictions it deemed
"necessary and appropriate" on this establishment.'6
Further, the standards focused on the establishment of new
branches and did not explicitly address existing branches.167 Without
an explicit statement in the new standards, retroactive application of
the standards could vary by nation. 168
The Minimum Standards were designed to promote cooperation
between home and host countries and encourage the flow of informa-
162 Erik Ipsen, Central Bankers Unveil New Anti-Fraud Rules, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 7,
1992, at 9; see MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 3.
163 See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 4; Ipsen, supra note 162, at 9.
164 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, DAILY
REP. EXEC. (BNA) No. 30, at A-1 (1992).
165 MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 6; see also Rod McNeil, Basel Group's Bank
Supervision Plan to Step Up International Coordination, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., July
13, 1992, at 1, 1-2 (summarizing this provision).
166 MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 6. The standards nevertheless require the
host-country regulator to supervise the establishment adequately. See id.
167 Three of the Minimum Standards' four principles apply solely to the creation of a
new banking establishment. See id. at 3-6. The first principle (requiring adequate home-
country consolidated supervision) is phrased as "a condition for the creation and mainte-
nance of cross-border banking establishments" and arguably may apply to existing estab-
lishments. Id. at 3; see also Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Pre-
vent Fraud, supra note 164, at A-1 (quoting Mr. Corrigan of the Committee as saying that
Minimum Standards "would 'by implication at least' be able to be applied to existing
branches").
168 Learning from BCCI, supra note 161, at 18. This is expected to be a long and cumber-
some process. Id.
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tion among bank regulators. 169 The standards were purposely vague,
however, in order to allow regulators the flexibility to interpret them
on a case-by-case basis.1 7
0
Like the Concordat and the Revised Concordat, the Minimum
Standards were not embodied in an enforceable treaty. The Commit-
tee, therefore, relied on regulators' moral authority and informal
pressure for enforcement. Furthermore, national regulators imple-
mented the standards in isolation from one another, causing discrep-
ancies in enforcement among nations.171 For instance, any penalties
for violation of banking laws or regulations based on the standards
rested with the individual country regulators.
Some critics argue that the Committee designed the Minimum
Standards to prevent the development of large banks in emerging
markets, and that banks in less developed nations would have the
most difficulty meeting its requirements. 172 While the Committee
might have been concerned about emerging market banks operating
in industrialized nations in the wake of BCCI,173 the Committee did
not intend to limit the expansion of banks from emerging markets.1 74
Rather, the Committee intended to respond more effectively to large
international bank failures. 75
6' See, e.g., MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 46, at 1-2 (encouraging cooperative ef-
forts), 4-5 (conditioning establishment of cross-border banks on bilateral information
exchange agreements).
170 Cf id. at 2 ('he following four minimum standards are to be applied by individual
supervisory authorities in their own assessment of their relations with supervisory authori-
ties in other countries.").
171 See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKING REGULATION § 9.05 (1998);
Patricia A. McCloy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7
CONN. INS. LJ. 433, 437 (2000).
172 McNeil, supra note 165, at 1. The United Nations Center on Transnational Corpo-
rations also issued a report in light of the closure of BCCI. UNITED NATIONS CR. ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., NEW ISSUES FOR TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TRANSNA-
TIONAL BANKING (1992); see Steve Lohr, U.N. Study Assails the Way B.C.C.I. Was Shut by West-
ern Central Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at D7. The report noted the massive losses
caused by the bank's closure and pointed out that the economic damage fell hardest on
countries such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, where BCCI was an important institution.
UNrIE NATIONS CTm. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., supra, at 13-14; Lohr, supra, at D7.
175 Mattingly Statement, supra note 127, at 917. Pakistani business executives founded
BCCI in 1972. Id. at 905.
174 Cf BIS Panel Lines Up Plans to Prevent New BCCIs, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR BANK
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E. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
The Basel Committee eventually developed more substantive
standards for bank regulation. Rather than focusing merely on the
coordination of international bank supervision, the Basel Committee
provided comprehensive minimum standards for bank supervision
when it published the Core Principles in 1997.176
After 1992, several prominent bank failures occurred. In March
1995, the venerable Barings Bank of London ("Barings") failed after a
trader in the Singapore operation, Nicholas Leeson, had lost over 927
million British pounds (US$ 1.1 billion) in the futures market in Sin-
gapore. 177 Leeson took advantage of his position as both a trader and
manager of the settlements operation in Barings' Singapore office to
hide his losses from his managers for several years. 178 By the time
these losses were discovered, they exceeded Barings' capital. Despte
intense negotiations, the Bank of England refused to support Barings,
and the bank was put into receivership in February 1995 and subse-
quently sold to ING.179
Later in 1995, the Federal Reserve Board revoked the charter of
the New York branch of the Daiwa Bank ("Daiwa") because of its con-
cealment of over US$ 1 billion in unrecorded trading losses incurred
in the bond market.18° Daiwa had informed the Japanese Ministry of
Finance of this information on August 8, 1995.181 The Ministry of Fi-
nance, however, delayed communicating the information to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board until September 18, 1995.182 The Federal Reserve
promptly issued an order under the Foreign Bank Supervision En-
hancement Act closing the Daiwa branch, which wound up its U.S.
operations on February 2, 1996.183 The Daiwa closing preceded a
1997 financial crisis that spread across Asia and resulted in the closure
176 See CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 2.
177Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of Financial Risks and Interna-
tional Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAW.
301, 309 (1996).
178 See id. at 307-09.
179 See id. at 323.
180 Kristin Leigh Case, The Daiwa Wake-Up Call: The Need for Standards for Banking Super-
vision, 26 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 215-16 (1996).
181 Id. at 216.
1' Id. at 217.
183 Id. at 215.
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of many banks and the dramatic decrease in the gross national prod-
ucts of nations such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.184
During this volatile period, the finance ministers and bank regu-
lators of the G-7 were becoming uneasy about the stability of the in-
ternational financial system. At the 1996 G-7 summit in Lyon, France,
the leaders (through the Summit Communique) requested standard-
setting bodies, including the Basel Committee, to draft more com-
prehensive and detailed financial standards.185 The leaders stated in
the communiqu6 that:
[they] welcome the work accomplished by the international
bodies concerned with banking and securities regulation...
[and o]ver the year ahead, [authorities] should seek to make
maximum progress on ... encouraging the adoption of
strong prudential standards in emerging economies and in-
creasing cooperation with their supervisory authorities; in-
ternational financial institutions and bodies should increase
their efforts to promote effective supervisory structures in
these economies. 186
The Basel Committee responded to this call by issuing the Core Prin-
ciples in September 1997, slightly over one year after the G-7's re-
quest.8 7
The Core Principles set forth broad guidelines on best practices
for bank supervision.18 The document does not merely deal with the
coordination of supervision of internationally active banks. Instead, it
details twenty-four guidelines for supervising entire national banking
184 See generally PETER G. PETERSON ET AL., SAFEGUARDING PROSPERITY IN A GLOBAL Fi-
NANCIAL SYSTEM: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (1999),
available at http://www.cfr.org/pubs.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (discussing a task force
implemented to combat the Asian financial crisis); Peter Kenen, The New International Finan-
cial Architecture: Reconstruction, Renovation or Minor Repair?, 5 INT'L J. FIN. & ECON. 1, 7-9
(2000) (exploring Thailand's bank failures).
'f See generally Making a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All: Economic
Communiqub, G-7 Lyon Summit, June 28, 1996, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
summit/19961yon/communique/index.htnl (advocating for the existence of specific
standards).
186 Strengthening Economic and Monetary Cooperation, Making a Success of Globalization
for the Benefit of All: Economic Communiqu6, G-7 Lyon Summit, June 28, 1996, available
at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/19961yon/communique/ecol.htm.
187 SeeFinal Report to the G-7 Heads of State and Government on Promoting Financial
Stability, Denver Summit of the Eight, June 21, 1997, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.
ca/summit/1997denver/finanrpt.htm.
188 See generally CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15 (presenting guiding principles for bank
supervision).
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systems from the licensing of banks to their closure due to insolvency.
Only three of the twenty-five principles deal with cross-border bank-
ing, which previously had been the focus of the Basel Committee's
standard-setting work.189 The remainder set forth guidelines for the
supervision of banks, even those without international operations.
This document represented a major expansion of the Basel Commit-
tee's work on bank supervision.
The twenty-five principles are divided into seven subject catego-
ries: preconditions for effective banking supervision (Principle 1),
licensing and structure (Principles 2-5), prudential regulations and
requirements (Principles 6-15), methods of ongoing banking super-
vision (Principles 16-20), information requirements (Principle 21),
formal powers of supervisors (Principle 22) and cross-border banking
(Principles 23-25).19° Although a detailed analysis of each principle is
beyond the scope of this Article, a summary of some of the key provi-
sions is relevant.
First, the Core Principles state that there are certain economic
conditions necessary for an effective bank supervisory system. A na-
tion must have sound macroeconomic policies, effective market disci-
pline, a well-developed legal system, sound accounting principles, an
orderly method for closing insolvent banks, and policies that promote
financial system stability such as lender of last resort responsibility and
depositor protection.191 Although bank supervisors generally do not
create or implement these policies, sound macroeconomic conditions
are vital to their ability to regulate banks effectively.
The Core Principles stress the need for the independence of
bank supervisors, a sentiment echoed by several commentators. 192 Su-
pervisors require adequate resources both with respect to the number
of staff and the independent, consistent funding to perform their
jobs.193 Effective supervisory systems will "have clear responsibilities
and objectives for each agency" involved in supervising banks.194
189 Id. at 41-43.
190 WALKER, supra note 13, at 131-35.
191 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 11-12.
192 See, e.g., Udaibir S. Das et al., Financial Regulators Need Independence, 39 FIN. & DEy. 23-
27 (2002); Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and
Financial Stability, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/46 (2002) avail-
able at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wpO 2 4 6 .pdf.; John G. Heirnann, In
Praise ofFinancialPlumbers, INT'L ECON., Apr. 1, 2004, at 64 (2002).
193 Das, supra note 192, at 13.
194 Id.
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Unfortunately, many countries' financial sector supervisors still
do not enjoy adequate independence. For example, recent banking
crises have involved connected lending between banks and their own-
ers or related parties at favorable interest rates. 195 Some of these bor-
rowers used their political influence to prevent bank supervisors from
forbidding or even questioning these loans.196 In a recent IMF survey
of the bank systems, 45% of regulators in emerging markets were not
operationally independent or lacked independent funding. 97
The language of the Core Principles sets forth the best practices of
bank supervision in broad terms. For instance, the Core Principles state
that supervisors should set "limits to restrict bank exposures to single
borrowers" or "groups of related borrowers."198 In the comments to the
Core Principles, the drafters indicate that 25% of capital should be the
maximum limit of a bank's exposure to a single borrower,199 but this is
not an absolute limit.200 Similarly, the Core Principles state that supervi-
sors must ensure that banks "have adequate policies, practices and pro-
cedures, including strict 'know-your-customer' rules, that promote high
ethical and professional standards." 201 The Core Principles do not
specifically define such rules, other than referring to the more detailed
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering recommenda-
tions. 202 This vagueness of language was necessary for the various Basel
Committee members to reach agreement on the Core Principles, and
to encourage several regional groups of bank supervisors to endorse
them.203
In addition to the members of the Basel Committee, bank super-
visory agencies from non-G-10 nations endorsed the Core Princi-
ples. 20 4 Representatives from Chile, the People's Republic of China,
195 Heimann, supra note 192, at 66; Kenen, supra note 184, at 7.
196 Heimann, supra note 192, at 66.
197 Agustin Carstens, Opportunities for Emerging and Developing Countries in
International Standard Setting: An IMF Perspective, Speech at the Fourth Annual IMF/
World Bank/Federal Reserve Seminar (June 2, 2004), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2004/060204a.htm.
198 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 26.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 39 (Principle 15).
202 Id. at 31; see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (2003), avail-
able at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/40Recs-2003 en.pdf. See generally Fin. Action Task
Force, More About the FATF and its Work, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (providing background on the FATF and their activities).
203 Jacques J. Sjben, Regulation Versus Market Discipline in Banking Supervision: An Over-
view, 4J. INT'L BANKING REG. 363, 374 (2002).
204 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1.
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the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand par-
ticipated in the drafting process, while officials from Argentina, Bra-
zil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Po-
land, and Singapore participated closely in the Core Principles'
development.205 The Core Principles thus represented one of the first
major Basel Committee projects that involved significant participation
by non-G-10 nations at the drafting stage. This addressed the recur-
ring criticism that the Basel Committee was exclusively a "rich coun-
tries" club.20 6
Besides direct participation during the drafting process, a
significant number of nations endorsed the Core Principles after they
were issued. At the October 1997 annual meeting of the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development ("World Bank"), the Core Principles were en-
dorsed by the attending nations. 20 7 The Group of 22 endorsed the
Core Principles, along with other international financial standards, in
an October 1998 report.208 In the same month, the International Con-
ference of Banking Supervisors endorsed the Core Principles and
pledged to implement them during their biennial conference. 2°9
As nations began to implement the Core Principles, it became
clear that bank supervisors needed additional guidance and explana-
tion. In order to provide such guidance, the Basel Committee issued
the Core Principles Methodology ("Methodology") in 1998.210 As the
Committee noted, "[e]xperience has already shown that the Princi-
ples may be interpreted in widely diverging ways, and incorrect inter-
pretations may result in inconsistencies among assessments."2 11 The
Methodology restated the language of each of the twenty-five princi-
ples, and then went on to describe criteria to be used in assessing
whether a particular nation has effectively implemented that princi-
ple. The criteria were divided into two groups: (1) essential criteria
that are the minimum level of implementation needed for compli-
ance, and (2) additional criteria that represent the best practice of
205 Id. at 1-2.
206 Howard Davies, Reforming the World's Regulatory System, ASIAN BANKERJ. at 1, Oct. 1,
2003, available at https://www.theasianbanker.com/a556c5/ournals.nsf/O/efd2O8O3db5
efbf648256d89002571ae.
207 CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 16, at 3.
208 Id.
2 09 Id.
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implementation. 212 Because of its detail, the Methodology has become
the more influential and useful document among bank supervisors.
F. Gaps in the Core Principles
Despite its breadth and specificity compared to other Basel
Committee documents, the Core Principles did not address some im-
portant issues in the bank supervisory system. First, they did not
specifically address whether a country should have a deposit insur-
ance scheme.2 13 Although, the Core Principles discuss a systemic
safety net as a precondition to effective supervision, they do not in-
clude a specific requirement for deposit insurance. 214 The Annex to
the Core Principles addresses this issue, and makes no recommenda-
tion regarding deposit insurance.2 15 It merely highlights the possibility
that deposit insurance increases the "risk of imprudent behaviour"216
by banks and stresses that any deposit insurance program "should be
tailored to the circumstances in, as well as historical and cultural fea-
tures of, each country."217
Furthermore, the Basel Committee did not make any recom-
mendation regarding the best organizational structure for bank su-
pervision. Numerous commentators and policymakers, however, have
already dealt with this issue.218 For instance, one study considered
whether there should be a single financial sector regulator similar to
the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom. 219 Another
discussed whether bank supervisory functions should be part of the
central bank, which has lender of last resort responsibility, or whether
they should be separated to avoid any potential conflict of interest.220
Australia adopted a "four peaks" approach, allocating regulatory re-
sponsibility to each agency by objective: financial stability, prudential
212 CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 16, at 2.
213 See id. at 7.
214 See id.
215 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 44.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See e.g., Rosa M. Lastra, The Government Structure in Financial Regulation and Supervi-
sion in Europe, 10 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 49 (2003).
219 See generally JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK: THE CASE
FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION (2000) (analyzing the study).
22 See generall Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine DiNoia, Financial Market Regulation and Su-
pervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal (Wharton School, Univ. of Pa., Report 01-02,
2001), at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0102.pdf (outlining the debate).
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supervision, consumer protection, and competition.22' Since com-
mentators and influential policymakers have not agreed on a best
structure, it is not surprising that the Basel Committee did not make
any recommendation on this topic. 222
Nor could the Basel Committee agree on common bank account-
ing standards. Principle 21 of the Core Principles recognizes the im-
portance of proper financial reporting that reflects the operations of
banks in a fair, consistent manner.223 Furthermore, some commonality
of accounting methods among nations is necessary for effective con-
solidated supervision of international banks, because differing ac-
counting standards make monitoring banks' financial operations in
different nations difficult.2 4 Nevertheless, the Basel Committee was
unable to agree on substantive rules for accounting standards. 25 It
appears that more substantive harmonization of bank accounting
standards will be left for a future revision of the Core Principles.
With the issuance of the Revised Capital Accord, however, the Basel
Committee has resources available to focus on revising the Core Princi-
ples. In any such revision, the Basel Committee should strengthen the
principle on bank accounting standards. While the Committee has
commented regularly on the work of the International Accounting
Standards Board and the International Auditing and Assurance Stan-
dards Board,226 the Committee still must provide further detail on such
standards in order to improve the compatability of bank financial re-
ports among nations.2 27
221 Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine DiNoia, Financial Market Regulation and Supervision:
How Many Peaksfor theEuro Area?, 28 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 463, 469-70 (2003).
222 Lastra, supra note 218, at 50.
223 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 35-36; CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra
note 16, at 43.
224 Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements and
Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, Speech at the U.S.-Europe Symposium 2002 in
Rischlikon, Switzerland, Towards Global Financial Accounting Standards: A Critical Pillar in
the International Financial Architecture (Feb. 27, 2002), at http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp020227.htm. There are significant differences between international accounting standards
(LAS) and U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. See id.
225 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 36.
226 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 34, at 168.
227 See generally Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Ser-
vices, From Quantity to Quality: The Future of Internal Market Regulation, European Policy
Centre Breakfast Policy Briefing (Apr. 7, 2005), at http://www.exchange-handbook.co.
uk/news-story.cfm?id =52266 (putting forth a similar argument).
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G. Revised CapitalAccord
As noted above, the Basel Committee issued another major in-
ternational financial standard relevant to the Core Principles-the
Revised Capital Accord. 228 This complex document sets forth various
methods whereby internationally active banks can calculate a bank's
minimum required capital. 29 Although a detailed analysis of this
document is beyond the scope of this Article, certain provisions are
relevant to this discussion because they may create an incentive for
nations to implement the Core Principles. 230
The Revised Capital Accord consists of three policy objectives or
"pillars."231 The first pillar describes the two principal methods avail-
able for calculating minimum capital levels for banks: the standard-
ized approach that establishes categories for different types of risk,
and the internal ratings-based approach that allows banks to use their
own internal risk valuation method. 232 The theory underlying risk
valuation is that a particular bank asset or loan will be evaluated for
risk, and a particular weight will be applied to that asset in order to
calculate the total risk-weighted assets of the bank.
233
The original Capital Accord provided a very simple method of cal-
culating minimum capital using risk weight categories. 234 Loans to
countries who are OECD members received a risk weight of 20%; loans
to nations outside of the OECD received a risk weight of 100%.235 This
meant that banks could allocate less capital to loans to OECD govern-
ments or banks incorporated in OECD countries. The Revised Capital
Accord provides for a much more sophisticated and complicated
method.
228 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48.
29 See CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 1.
230 See infra notes 430-447 and accompanying text.
231 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, para. 4.
232 Id. paras. 50-51.
233 See id.
234 CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 7-8. The 1988 Capital Accord was
26 pages of text compared to the Revised Capital Accord with 251 pages of text. Id.
235 CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 17-18 (Annex 2). The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") is an international organiza-
tion originally formed to administer aid from the Marshall Plan after World War H in
Europe. The OECD, based in Paris, now focuses on international economic research and
intergovernmental economic cooperation. See generally OECD, THE OECD, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (describ-
ing the purpose of the OECD).
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The second pillar of the Revised Capital Accord refers to the
prudential supervision of the risk valuation method chosen. 2" 6 In the
prior Capital Accord, only one method of calculating minimum capi-
tal was available. 237 In the Revised Capital Accord, two principal
methods are available. 238 Bank supervisors must understand and ap-
prove the method selected by each particular bank.239
The third pillar calls for using market discipline to enforce the Re-
vised Capital Accord.2 40 The Basel Committee recommends that banks
disclose both their valuation method in general terms and their capital
levels to depositors and the general public.241 The market can then
evaluate the method chosen and the amount of capital retained by the
bank and reflect any risk in the stock price of the particular bank.242
The changes to the formula for calculating minimum capital, par-
ticularly the standardised approach in Pillar I, are relevant to this dis-
cussion. In determining the risk weight for credits to sovereign and
corporate borrowers, banks can refer to external credit assessments
from rating agencies243 such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, or Fitch, or
ratings from export credit insurance agencies. 244 These agencies and
their analysts take compliance with the Core Principles and other in-
ternational financial standards into account when determining each
country's sovereign credit rating. 245 Countries that comply with interna-
tional financial standards, such as the Core Principles, tend to receive
more favorable sovereign credit ratings.246 A favorable credit rating
places a country in a lower risk weight category.247 Therefore, countries
that comply with international financial standards, and the banks lo-
cated therein, will benefit from lower interest rates on loans, because
banks will be able to allocate less capital to a loan placed in a lower risk
236 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, para. 719.
237 CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 7-8.
238 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, para. 7.
239 Id. paras. 720-24.
240 Id. para. 809.
241 Id. para. 810.
242 See id. para. 809.
243 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, paras. 52-55, 66-68.
244 Id.
245 John Chambers, The Importance of the IMF's Work on Standards and Codes,
Speech to the Annual Meeting of the IMF/IBRD (Sept. 2002), in Ratings Direct (2002); E-
mail regarding Sovereign Ratings from Richard Fox, Senior Director of the Sovereign
Team at Fitch Ratings, to Duncan E. Alford, Head of Reference, Georgetown University
Law Library (July 15, 2004) (on file with author).
246 See Chambers, supra note 245.
247 See REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, para. 52.
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weight category. A more detailed discussion of the effects of the Re-
vised Capital Accord on enforceability of the Core Principles follows.
I. IMPLEMENTATION
As mentioned above, the Core Principles are a statement of best
practices expressed as guidelines. Like other Basel Committee docu-
ments, they do not have the force of law and must be implemented at
the national level. As such, implementation of the Core Principles has
varied significantly by nation. While most developing nations have
implemented the Core Principles to a large extent, emerging markets
and transition economies have only done so to a more limited de-
gree.248 This section highlights the implementation of the Core Prin-
ciples in selected important financial markets: the European Union,
the United Kingdom, France, Hong Kong, and the United States.
A. European Union
Among the objectives of the European Union ("EU") are the
creation of an internal market and the dismantling of internal trade
restrictions. 249 The creation of this internal market for financial serv-
ices has been more difficult and problematic than for manufactured
goods. In the 1998 European Council meeting in Vienna, the leaders
of the EU called for the prompt integration of the financial services
sector among member nations. 250 Subsequently, the European Com-
mission proposed a Financial Services Action Plan that outlined the
steps (including forty-two legislative measures) to complete the crea-
tion of an internal market for financial services. 251 As of June 2004,
nearly all the required legislation at the EU level had been enacted. 252
Nevertheless, member nations have yet to enact legislation at the na-
248 Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the
Basle Accord?, 5J. INT'L ECON. L. 647, 655-57 (2002).
249 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 3, OJ. (C
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
250 See Vienna European Council, Presidency Conclusions, para. 51 (Dec. 11-12, 1998),
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-RI.EN.htm.
251 European Comm'n, Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action
Plan, COM(99)232 final at 21-31.
252 See EUROPEAN COMM'N, TURNING THE CORNER: PREPARING THE CHALLENGE OF THE
NEXT PHASE OF EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION 1 (June 2, 2004), at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/ internal market/en/finances/action plan/ progressI Oen.pdf. The
principle type of legislation used to implement the FSAP was the the directive. See generally
KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW (2000) (giving a basic descrip-
tion of the legislative process and the types of EU legislation).
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tional level to implement the various EU directives. 253 Certain Finan-
cial Services Action Plan directives are related to the Core Principles,
including the Regulation on the Application of International Ac-
counting Standards2 4 and the Directive on Supplementary Supervi-
sion of Credit Institutions. 2 55
The supervision of banks within the EU is primarily the responsi-
bility of member states and is not conducted at the EU level.2 56 The
European Central Bank ("ECB") along with the European System of
Central Banks ("ESCB") controls monetary policy for the member
states that are part of the European Monetary Union. 257 The ECB does
not, however, have direct responsibility for the supervision of banks
within the EU. Under the Treaty on European Union ("Treaty"), the
ECB can only aid in the smooth operation of prudential supervision of
banks.25 8 The Treaty does contain a special provision allowing the ECB
to assume prudential supervision over banks, but this authority requires
a unanimous approval from Member States that would be nearly im-
possible to obtain.25 9 The proposed constitutional treaty does not
change this structure. 26° Overall, banking law at the EU level currently
has little substantive influence on bank supervision within the EU. Most
bank supervisory practice is provided for in the national law of the
Member States.
Nevertheless, the EU is in the midst of restructuring its financial
regulatory agencies in order to further integrate the financial services
253 EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 252, at 1.
254 Commission Regulation 1606/2002, 2002 Oj. (L 243) 1.
255 Council Directive 2002/87, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1. With the accession of ten new
Member States to the EU in 2004, publication of EU directives has been delayed because
of a lack of translators between the now twenty official languages of the EU. Translations
May Hold Up Basel II, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERV., Dec. 6, 2004. The 400 page directive
implementing the Revised Basel Accord (or Basel II) is a prime example. Juliane von Rep-
pert, ECOFIN: EU Unanimous on Banks' Capital Requirement Bill, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,
Dec. 7, 2004.
256 See Tom Buerkle, European Disunion, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1 2002, at 52;
European Cent. Bank, European Monetary Union and Banking Supervision, ECB MONTHLY
BULL., Apr. 2000, at 49-64. See generally IMPROVING BANKING SUPERVISION (David G. Mayes
et al. eds., 2001) (proposing changes to the current system).
257 EC TREATY art. 105(1)-(2). The Eurozone countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
European Cent. Bank, The Euro Area: Participating Countries, at http://www.ecb.int/bc/
intro/htmd/map.en.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
258 EC TREATY art. 105(5).
259 Id. art. 105 (6); see Tom de Swaan, The Changing Role of Banking Supervision, 6 ECON.
POL'Y REv.75, 78 (2000); Lastra, supra note 218, at 56-57.
260 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 1II-77(5)-(6), 2003
Oj. (C169) 42 (currently unratified).
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sector within the EU. As part of the Financial Services Action Plan,
the European Commission asked a group of prominent politicians
involved in monetary and economic affairs ("Committe of Wise
Men") to report on improving the regulation of the securities markets
in the EU.26 1 Led by Alexandre Lamfalussy, the Committee of Wise
Men issued a report ("Report of the Wise Men") recommending
changes in the enactment of legislation governing the securities mar-
kets in Europe. 262 The Report of the Wise Men developed a new legis-
lative process ("Lamfalussy Process"), originally intended for the secu-
rities markets, that the European Commission has recommended be
extended to the other parts of the financial services sector-namely,
banking and insurance. 263 The European Council and the European
Parliament have in turn agreed on a Directive that applies the Lam-
falussy Process to the banking and insurance sectors. 26
The Lamfalussy Process creates four levels of lawmaking to im-
plement policy and enact laws governing the financial services sec-
tor.265 A weakness of the current EU legislative procedure is the
amount of time required to enact legislation after it has been pro-
posed by the European Commission, especially when using the pre-
dominant method of enacting EU legislation, the codecision proce-
dure.266 A period of two to two and a half years is not uncommon for
261 EUROPEAN COMM'N, INITIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGU-
LATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS Annex I (Nov. 9, 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/docs/amfalussy/wisemen/initial-
report-wise-men en .pdf.
262 EUROPEAN COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGU-
LATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men-en.pdf
[hereinafter WISE MEN REPORT]; see European Comm'n, Lamfalussy Report, at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/lamfalussy/indexen.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2005).
263 See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://europa.
eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2003/com2003_O659en0 l.pdf.
264 ECOFIN Council of Ministers, Minutes of Meeting, May 14, 2004; European Par-
liament, Session Documents, Report, March 17, 2004 (Rapporteur: Christa Randzio-Plath
A5-0162/2004). European Parliament was concerned about the institutional balance of
power and wanted to retain its input into legislation. BULL. E.U. 5-2004, § 1.3.2.3.
2 6
5 WISE MEN REPORT, supra note 262, at 19.
26See EU, Key Players in EU Legislation, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/
pap/index.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2004). A detailed description of the codecision
procedure used to enact EU legislation is beyond the scope of this article. Generally code-
cision requires agreement among the Council of the European Union and the European
Parliament before legislation becomes law. See id.
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enacting legislation.2 67 Level I of the Lamfalussy Process involves the
adoption of directives and regulations using the codecision procedure
at the EU level.268 Level II involves the implementation of the law by
providing additional details. 2 69 This level is analogous to the rulemak-
ing by U.S. administrative agencies such as the Comptroller of the
Currency or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Report
of the Wise Men recommended that a special committee of national
supervisory officials be created to develop these details.2 70 Level III
refers to greater cooperation among national supervisors to "ensure
consistent enforcement and implementation."271 As with Level II, the
Report of the Wise Men recommended the creation of a committee to
coordinate supervisory practice among EU member states. 272 Level IV
refers to more effective enforcement of EU laws.273
Level II and Level I are being implemented by committees estab-
lished by the European Commission. The European Commission has
created the European Banking Committee (formerly the Banking Advi-
sory Committee) as a Level II committee.274 In addition, in January
2004, the Council created the Committee of European Banking Super-
visors as a Level Ill committee. 275 This committee will coordinate bank
supervisory practices so as to create a level playing field for banks
within the EU. 276 These committees are so new that there is little basis
upon which to evaluate their effectiveness. The EU is clearly attempting
to centralize banking supervision as much as possible within the legal
267 See Kees Van Dijkhuzen, A Functional Approach to Fifty Years of Banking Supervision, in
BANKING SUPERVISION AT THE CROSSROADS 44, 51 (Thea Kuppens ed., 2003).
268 ECOFIN, 10th FSAP Progress Report 11, available at http://europa.eu.int/conun/
internal-market/fi nances/docs/actionplan/index/ progressl0 - en.pdf (last visited May 4,
2005). Directives are a type of EU legislation that sets out the objectives of the law but re-
quires member states to enact national legislation to implement the law. See BORCHARDT,
supra note 252, at 63-71.
269 WISE MEN REPORT, supra note 262, at 28.
270 See id. at 28-35.
271 Id. at 37.
272 See id. at 37-38.
273 See id. at 40.
274 European Comm'n, Decision Establishing the European Banking Commission,
2004 oJ. (L3) 36-37.
275 European Comm'n, Decision Establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, 2003 O.J. (L3) 28.
276 Jose Maria Roldan, Chair of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Es-
tablishment of the Committee and Future Challenges, Speech to Members of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Banking Federation (Apr. 26,
2004), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/speeches/SP2.htm.
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limits of the treaty.277 A clear trend within EU law on financial services
is the increased centralization of bank regulation within the EU. Never-
theless, although the EU is moving towards more involvement in bank
and financial services supervision and regulation, most supervision of
banks operating within the EU still occurs at the national level.
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is not part of the European Monetary Un-
ion and has maintained its own independent currency, the pound
sterling. In 2000, the British Parliament radically reorganized the
agencies supervising and regulating the financial services sector by
enacting the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000.278 Nine sepa-
rate agencies that regulated the securities, banking, and insurance
sectors were merged into one regulatory agencym-the Financial Serv-
ices Authority ("FSA"). 279 The Bank of England continues to be re-
sponsible for monetary policy and serves as the lender of last resort,
but its supervisory function has been wholly transferred to the FSA.28°
The failures of BCCI and Barings hurt the credibility of the Bank of
England as a supervisor and prompted Parliament, at least in part, to
strip the Bank of England of its supervisory function.
The United Kingdom has an active, well-developed financial sec-
tor and is particularly strong in international finance. 281 Its stock mar-
ket is the third largest in the world in terms of market capitaliza-
tion. 282 The bank supervisory system in the United Kingdom is
similarly well-developed and sophisticated, as confirmed by the IMF.
In 2003, the IMF evaluated the soundness and stability of the United
Kingdom's financial system as part of its Financial Sector Assessment
Program ("FSAP"). 283 Under the FSAP, the IMF sends an inspection
277 Antonio Sainz de Vicuna, The ESCB and its Role in Banking Supervision, 34 INT'L LAW.
117, 118 (2000). ECB would like to have clear bank supervisory authority. See id.278 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.).
279 See Explanatory Notes to Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, ch. 8 (Eng.),
paras. 8-13, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2000/2000en08.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2005).
28D See Heidi Mandaris Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 411, 428-29 (2003).
281 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED KINGDOM 40 (2004).
282 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 872 tbl.1376
(2003).
288 IMF, UNITED KINGDOM: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT (Feb. 2003),
available at http://www.inif.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/crO346.pdf [hereinafter U.K.
FSAP REPORT].
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team of financial regulators to evaluate and critique each country's
financial system, with the aim of improving the soundness of each
country's financial system and enhancing the stability of the interna-
tional financial system as a whole. 2s4 As part of this assessment, the
inspection team also evaluates the implementation of key financial
standards, including the Core Principles.
285
The 2003 FSAP report concluded that the supervisory system in
the United Kingdom is state of the art and fully complies with the
Core Principles. 286 The report determined that the FSA had clear
regulatory objectives, was independent, and was separately funded by
industry assessments. 28 7 Thus, the FSA structure met the independ-
ence requirement of Principle 1 of the Core Principles. 28 The FSA
controlled licensing of banks, and British law limited use of the term
"bank."2s9 Likewise, the FSA had the legal authority to approve the
transfer of control of financial institutions. 290
The report did, however, make some minor recommendations.
Adequate staff resources are part of the independence requirement
of the Core Principles.2 1 The inspection team, however, noted that
there were relatively few bank supervisory personnel in the FSA,
292
and the staff available to supervise the market operations of banks was
thin compared to those supervising securities firms.293 Also, the report
recommended additional reporting by banks to the FSA, in particular,
reports on nonperforming loans, capital adequacy, and other supervi-
sory financial ratios.2 94 The FSA, in its reply to the Assessment Report,
generally agreed with the conclusions, but noted that, in its opinion,
current supervisory practices met the concerns expressed in the re-
port.295
284 IMF, IMF Reviews Experience with the Financial Sector Assessment Program and Reaches
Conclusions on Issues Going Forward (Apr. 4, 2003), at http://www.inif.org/external/np/
sec/pn/2003/pn0346.htm.
285 IMF, List of Standards, Codes and Principles Useful for Bank and Fund Operational Work
and for which Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes are Produced (Nov. 2002), at
http://www.inf.org/external/standards/scnew.htm (list of 12 core standards).
286 See U.K. FSAP REPORT, supra note 283, at 1.
287 Id. at 60.
288 Id.; see CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1.
289 U.K. FSAP REPORT, supra note 283, at 60.
290 Id.
291 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 13.
292 See U.K. FSAP REPORT, supra note 283, at 62.
23 Id.
2% Id.
m Id. at 65.
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Overall, the United Kingdom is in full compliance with the Core
Principles. The FSAP assessment report only raised some minor issues
involving reporting and adequate staffing, neither of which rose to a
level of non-compliance. In addition, an independent, non-profit,
standards-monitoring organization has rated the United Kingdom
second in the world with respect to compliance with twelve key stan-
dards, including the Core Principles.296
C. France
Unlike the United Kingdom, France has chosen a sector-based
regulatory scheme with separate agencies supervising banking, securi-
ties, and insurance. 297 The banking system in France is regulated by
three separate governmental agencies: le Comit6 des Etablissements de
Credit et des Enterprises d'Investissement ("CECEI"), the Commission
Bancaire ("Commission"), and the ministre chargee de l'Economie et
des Finances (the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry).29s Be-
fore August 2003, an independent agency, la Comit6 de la Rrglementa-
tion Bancaire et Financirre, regulated bank competition, but the law
enacted in August 2003 transferred its powers to the Ministry of Fi-
nance.299 The Bank of France (1a Banque de France) governs monetary
policy in a manner similar to that of the Bank of England and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board in the United States. The CECEI primarily adminis-
ters the licensing of banks and the authorization of foreign banking
establishments to operate in France.3 00 The Commission is the primary
agency responsible for bank supervision in France.3 0 '
The Commission is composed of six members and is chaired by
the Governor of the Bank of France.3 0 2 The Director of the Treasury
296 See ESTANDARDS FORUM WEEKLY REPORT, July 26-30, 2004, available at http://
www.estandardsforum.com. EStandards Forum is an affiliate of the Financial Standards
Foundation headed by George Vojta, former managing director of Bankers Trust in New
York.
297 IMF, FRANCE: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 25 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/crO4344.pdf [hereinafter FSSA FRANCE].
M8 PHILLIPPE NEAu-LEDUC, DROIT BANCAIRE 56-57 (2003).
299 Law No. 2003-706 of August 1, 2003,J.O., Aug. 2, 2003, p. 13220; see NEAU-LEDUC,
supra note 298, at 57.
300 See BANQUE DE FR., LE CADREJURIDIQUE D'EXERCICE DES AcTIvIrTs BANCAIRES ET
FINANCIkRS 61-76 (2003), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/supervi/telechar/
agrement/3.1cecei2003.pdf.
30'NEAu-LEDUC, supra note 298, at 59.
302 Id. at 60; French Banking Act, Law No. 84-46 of Jan. 24, 1984, art. 38, available at
http://www.gbld.org/xml/France/France-BA.doc [hereinafter French Banking Act].
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is a member of the Commission. 303 There are four other members
nominated by the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Industry,
one of whom is generally an advisor to the Conseil d'6tat and another
is an advisor to the Cours de Cassation.30 4 The other two members are
selected based on their expertise in monetary and banking law.305
These four nominated members serve terms of six years.306 The
Commission supervises credit institutions for financial soundness and
compliance with banking law.30 7 The Commission has extensive en-
forcement powers, from the imposition of fines to the mandatory liq-
uidation and closure of banks.30 8 The Commission relies to a certain
degree on personnel of the Bank of France, or outside auditors, to
conduct bank inspections.3°9
The IMF conducted an FSAP assessment of France during
2004.310 The assessment report issued to the public in November 2004
found that France generally complied with international standards
and confirmed its "financial sector is strong and well-supervised."31'
The report did note, however, that France should strengthen the co-
operation among various regulatory agencies and monitor the poten-
tially risky expansions of certain French banks into both financial and
non-financial enterprises. 31 2 Currently, banks may acquire non-
financial enterprises without the approval of CECEI.313 The FSA rec-
ommended that the CECEI be granted the power to supervise any
expansion into non-financial industries.3 14 The report also criticized
the administrative intervention of the French government into the
banking market, particularly the setting of the deposit interest rates
and the maximum interest rate on loans.31 5
The FSAP assessment also indicated that, given the institutional
structure of the French bank regulatory agencies, the independence
303 NEAu-LEDUC, supra note 298, at 60.
W4 Id.
305 Id.
306 French Banking Act, art. 38; NEAu-LEDUC, supra note 298, at 60.
3 07 NEAU-LEDUC, supra note 298, at 60.
so Id. at 64-65.
309 Id. at 61.
310 See IMF, France: 2004 Article IV Consultation, Concluding Statement of the Mission (July
6, 2004), at para. 16, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2004/070604.htn [herein-
after France Consultation].
311 FSSA FRANCE, supra note 297, at 3.
312 France Consultation, supra note 310, at paras. 16-17.
313 FSSA FRANCE, supra note 297, at 29.
314 Id.
315 SeeFrance Consultation, supra note 310, at para. 17.
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of the bank supervisor is questionable. The Bank of France and the
Treasury have permanent seats on the Commission Bancaire and the
other members are appointed by the Ministry of the Economy.
3 1 6
While the members do have fixed terms, the executive branch has
extensive control over the membership of the Commission.3 17 In addi-
tion, the Commission relies to a significant degree on personnel over
whose activities the Commission has no direct control.3 18 Further-
more, Bank representatives serve on the board of the CECEI, creating
potential conflicts of interest.319 These factors detract from the inde-
pendence of the bank regulator as compared to Great Britain. Princi-
ple 1 of the Core Principles refers to the independence of the regula-
tor, both operationally and with respect to funding and adequate
staffing levels.3 20
Overall, France is in compliance with the Core Principles, though
the independence of the regulator may be weaker than in other G-7
nations. An independent assessment group has ranked France nine-
teenth in the world with respect to compliance with international
financial standards.321
D. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("SAR") is a ma-
jor global financial center. Its stock market is ranked fifth by market
capitalization in the world and nearly every major international bank
maintains an office in Hong Kong.3 22 Although Hong Kong had been
a British colony since the 19th century and ruled by a governor ap-
pointed by the British crown,3 23 sovereignty over Hong Kong was
transferred by Great Britain to the People's Republic of China in
316 FSSA FRANCE, supra note 297, at paras. 44-45.
17 Id.
s Id.
319 Id. at para. 45.
320 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1.
321 ESTANDARDS FORUM WEEKLY REPORT, supra note 296, at 11.
322 See IMF, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE RE-
GION: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 16 (June 2003), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/crO3191.pdf [hereinafter HK FSAP REPORT]; H.K.
MONETARY AuTH., HONG KONG AS AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE 1, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/public/fs99/fslO.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). Of
the world's top 100 banks, seventy-one have a full banking license in Hong Kong and five
others have representative offices. See id.
323 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: HONG KONG S.A.R. 4-5 (2004).
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1997.324 The fundamental legal document now governing Hong Kong
is the Basic Law. 325 The Legislative Council in Hong Kong enacts laws
with the approval of the Chief Executive, including the Banking Or-
dinance that governs the structure of the bank regulatory agencies
and provides for the supervision of banks.3 26
Banks dominate the credit markets in Hong Kong. The three
largest banks account for 57% of deposits. 327 The banking market
takes on an oligopolistic character and, until 2000, operated like a
cartel. 328 Deposit interest rate setting by the larger banks was phased
out in 2001.329
Regulation of the financial services market in Hong Kong is or-
ganized by traditional sectors-banking, insurance, and securities.
330
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") is the principal su-
pervisor of banks in Hong Kong, as well as those organized or operat-
ing therein.331 In addition, the HKMA implements monetary policy
and supervises the payment and settlements system.
332
In 2002, the IMF conducted an FSAP inspection of Hong Kong.
333
The report concluded that Hong Kong's financial system is "resilient,
sound and overseen by a comprehensive supervisory framework."
334
Hong Kong bank supervisors were adequately financed and had ap-
propriate enforcement powers to comply with the Core Principles.
3 5
No bank failures occured in Hong Kong from 1993 through 2003.
336
According to the assessment report, the primary weakness of the
bank supervisory structure in Hong Kong is the lack of independence
of the HKMA. 33 7 The procedures for appointment, compensation,
324China and Hong Kong-The Parade Gets Rained On, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2004, at 8,
available at 2004 WLNR 6547360.
325 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1511, available at http://info.
gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext/index.htm [hereinafter Basic Law]. This document is roughly
analogous to a constitution.
326 Banking Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, ch. 155 (1997).
327 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 17.
328 BERRY F.C. Hsu, LAws OF BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE HONG KONG SAR 160
(1998).
29 SeeHK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 18.
330 Id. at 23.
331 Banking Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, 1997, ch. 155, §§ 2, 7.
332 See id.
333 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 1.
334 Id.
33 Id. at 8.
336 See id.
337 See id. at 9.
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dismissal, and terms of office of the senior HKMA officials are not ex-
plicit and need to be so. 338 In addition, current legislation does not
delineate the HKMA's regulatory and supervisory responsibilities, nor
its monetary policy objectives.33 9
Good bank supervisory governance is characterized by inde-
pendence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. According to
the FSAP assessment, Hong Kong's banking regime needs improve-
ment with respect to the first three.3 40 The Financial Secretary ap-
points the head of the HKMA.3 41 The "procedures for appointment,
terms of office, and grounds for dismissal" of the head of the HKMA
are not explicitly provided in legislation.3 42 The Financial Secretary
can exempt persons from the Banking Ordinance without limita-
tion.3 43 HKMA lacks a board that oversees its regular operations.
344
Any appeal of a supervisory order issued by the HKMA goes to the
Chief Executive of the SAR, a political official.
3 45
Articles 109 and 110 of the Basic Law vest responsibility for
financial market supervision in the government.3 46 The executive
branch is predominant in the Hong Kong government, and the Chief
Executive has a reserve power to direct statutory bodies, including the
HKMA, to take certain actions. 347 There are few publicly disclosed lim-
its on this reserve power.3 48 The Chief Executive could, for instance,
direct the HKMA to issue a banking license or forbid them from re-
voking a banking license. Section 11 of the Securities and Futures Or-
dinance, which regulates the securities market, sets conditions on the
use of this reserve power in the context of securities regulation.
3 49
The FSAP assessment team recommended that similar limits be
338 Id.
339 See id; cf. EC TREATY art. 105 (noting that the European Central Bank's primary ob-
jective is price stability).
340 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 33.
341 Id.
342 Id. The insurance supervisory agencies are part of the Financial Services and
Treasury Bureau. Id. They are part of the Hong Kong government and are therefore not
independent. Id.
343 See id.; Banking Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, c. 155, § 13.
34 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 34. The Banking Advisory Committee advises
the Chief Executive on bank regulation and how it affects business activities of banks. The
Financial Secretary chairs this Committee.
345 Id.
346 Basic Law, supra note 325, arts. 109-110, 29 L.M. at 1537.
47 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 34.
348 See id.
34 Securities and Futures Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, c. 571, § 11 (2003).
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placed on the use of the reserve power by the Chief Executive in the
bank regulatory arena.350
Thus, Hong Kong's primary deficiency in complying with the
Core Principles is the HKMA's lack of independence. The Chief Ex-
ecutive of the SAR can intervene in any matter under the Banking
Ordinance.3 51 While the Chief Executive has never used this reserve
power, its "presence poses a potential threat to supervisory independ-
ence"3 5 2 and raises the serious possibility of government interference
into bank supervisory matters. Such concerns are particularly relevent
in light of recent outcries over sedition laws proposed by the govern-
ment, as well as other perceived abuses of power.353
The HKMA vehemently disagreed with the FSAP Report's analysis
of regulatory independence.3 54 The HKMA argues that the Chief Ex-
ecutive has never used the reserve power and will only use it as a last
resort.3 55 The restraint on this power is "deeply embedded," and any
abuse of the power would be "politically untenable."356 This response,
however, was written prior to the recent introduction of the sedition
law by the Hong Kong government and the subsequent mass protests
against the Hong Kong government's perceived abuse of power.
35 7
The FSAP report also noted that regulatory arrangements re-
garding the financial system are "strongly reliant on personal relation-
ships and understanding at the level of agency heads and the gov-
ernment."358 In order to clarify such arrangements, the relevant
agencies should issue a clear statement of policy regarding their rela-
tionship in times of financial stress, as well as a public disclosure of
the specific roles of the various regulatory agencies.359
350 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 34-35.
351 Id. at 39.
352 Id.
353 SeeA Bill Too Far, ECONOMIST,July 5, 2003, at 7.
34 See HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 41.
35 Id.
36 Id.
357 See The Parade Gets Rained On, supra note 324, at 8; A Bill Too Far, supra note 353, at
7.
358 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 35.
359 Id. In fact, these regulatory agencies have issued a formal statement setting forth
the responsibilities of senior regulators, separating policy formulation from execution. See
IMF, HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION-STAFF
REPORT 18 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr563.
pdf; IMF, IMF Concludes 2004 Article IV Consultation with the People's Republic of China-Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Feb. 21, 2005), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
pn/2005/pn0525.htm.
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Regarding financial system stability, Hong Kong currently has no
deposit insurance scheme.3' ° While a deposit insurance scheme is not
a requirement under the Core Principles, it is listed as a technique or
tool to enhance financial system stability.361 A bill establishing a de-
posit insurance system was enacted by the Legislative Council with a
plan to commence operations in 2006.362
Overall, Hong Kong is in compliance with the Core Principles,
although substantial issues have been raised with respect to the inde-
pendence, accountability, and transparecy of its banking regulation
system. An observer of the compliance of international standards
ranks Hong Kong sixth in the world.3 63
E. United States
The United States has the largest financial services market in the
world. 364 The complex structure of bank regulation in the United
States matches the complexity and size of its financial services market.
The hallmark of the U.S. banking system is its dual nature; banks can
be chartered either by individual states or by the U.S. government.3 65
While this dual banking system creates a complex licensing and su-
pervisory system, it is unlikely to change. In recent years, the U.S.
Congress has concentrated regulatory authority over foreign bank
operations and complex financial organizations at the national level
with the Federal Reserve System.3s
At the federal level, there are three primary bank supervisors in
the United States: the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
("Federal Reserve"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). 3 67
The Federal Reserve governs monetary policy and supervises certain
institutions within the U.S. banking system-members of the Federal
Reserve system, financial holding companies, and foreign banks operat-
ing in the United States. 368 Each of the Governors of the Federal Re-
360 HK FSAP REPORT, supra note 322, at 39.
361 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 46.
362 Deposit Protection Scheme Ordinance, Laws of Hong Kong, c. 581; see Insurance for
a Rainy Day, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 20, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 5971605.
363 ESTANDARDS FORUM WEEKLY REPORT, supra note 296, at 11.
364 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 282, at 872.
36 1-1 Banking Law § 1.04 (Matthew Bender ed. 2004).
m6 Schooner, supra note 280, at 411-12.
-7 See 12 U.S.CA. § 3101 (2004).
- See 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2000); MICHAEL GRUSEN & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF
FOREIGN BANKS § 1.01 (2003).
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serve, including the Chairman, are appointed by the President of the
United States for fourteen year terms, subject to confirmation by the
U.S. Senate. 369
The Comptroller of the Currency supervises national banks.370 Na-
tional banks are credit institutions that have sought a federal charter
under the National Bank Act, rather than a banking license from a par-
ticular state.371 The Comptroller of the Currency is appointed by the
President for a five year term and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.372 The
OCC, part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, issues regulations
on the permissible activities of national banks, conducts on-site and off-
site inspections, and has comprehensive enforcement authority.373
The FDIC provides deposit insurance to member banks, for
which they pay an insurance premium. 374 The FDIC also issues regula-
tions governing the activities of member banks, both federally and
state-chartered, and has comprehensive enforcement powers over its
members. 375 The FDIC is governed by a five member board, one of
whom is the Comptroller of the Currency, one of whom is the Direc-
tor of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the other three of whom
are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.376 The
appointed directors of the Board serve six year terms. The Chairman
of the FDIC is chosen from these three appointed directors and serves
a five year term. 377
Other types of financial institutions are supervised by separate
regulatory agencies. The National Credit Union Association super-
vises credit unions,378 and the Office of Thrift Supervision supervises
savings and loan associations. 379
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act represented a major revision of
financial services law.38° This act removed the prohibition against the
conduct of commercial lending and investment banking activities
within the same financial enterprise, a prohibition imposed by the
- 12 U.S.C. § 241.
370 Id. § 26.
371 National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-43 (2004).
372 Id. § 2.
37 Id. §§ 21-43.
374 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1815.
3- 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819.
376 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (1).
377 12 U.S.C.A. § 1812(b)(1).
378 Federal Credit Union Act, id. §§ 1751-1759k (2004).
3- Id. §§ 1462-70.
3w See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Star. 1338 (1999) (codified as as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809. (1999)).
[Vol. 28:237
Enforceable International Financial Standards
Glass-Steagall Act following the Great Depression. 38' In addition, the
act made the Federal Reserve the umbrella regulator for financial
holding companies, a new designation for complex financial services
organizations. 38 2
The IMF has not yet conducted an FSAP assessment of the
United States. However, the U.S. Department of the Treasury con-
ducted a self-assessment of U.S. compliance with the Core Principles
in 1998.383 The self-assessment concluded that the United States gen-
erally complies with the Core Principles. 384 The bank regulatory agen-
cies are independent and have sufficient staff resources and fund-
ing.385 The supervisors have the authority to issue licenses and
sufficient enforcement authority, from issuing fines to ordering the
closure of banks.386 The various regulatory agencies have issued ap-
propriate regulations on capital adequacy and loan exposure s387
The only weakness highlighted in the self-assessment was the lack
of mandatory "know-your-customer" rules to discourage the use of the
banking system for money laundering or criminal activity.388 Since the
issuance of the self-assessment, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
has issued regulations requiring banks to institute a Customer
Identification Program.389 These regulations meet the requirement of
"know-your-customer-rules" set forth in Principle 15 of the Core Princi-
ples.390
Overall, the United States is compliant with the Core Principles.
According to its own self-assessment, it has fully implemented the
Core Principles. 391 Furthermore, an independent observer has ranked
-1 12 U.S.C. § 6805 (repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377).
s8 Id. § 103; see also Joseph J. Norton and Christopher D. Olive, A By-product of the
Globalization Process: The Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitons: The U.S. Regulatory
Framework, 56 Bus. LAw. 591, 623-32 (2001) (discussing the effect of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act).
383 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT ON CORE PRINCIPLES
(1998), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/standards/codel0.
pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The self-assessment was completed in 1998 in response to a
questionnaire on implementation of the Core Principles sent out by the Basel Committee.
See CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 16, at 4.
s8 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 383 (finding that the United
States, for the most part, follows the Core Principles).
'85 Id. at 3.
386 Id. at 10-12.
s87 See id. at 16-19.
s88 Id. at 35.
-n 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004).
390 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 6.
391 See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
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the United States first in the world for compliance with international
financial standards, including the Core Principles. 92
F. Emerging Markets
Implementation of the Core Principles by emerging markets has
been more problematic. Generally, the industrialized nations and, in
particular, those represented on the Basel Committee, comply with
the Core Principles. As seen by recent bank failures, however, this
does not mean that the financial systems of the industrialized nations
are not risk-free.393 According to one source, nearly 70% of nations do
not adhere to the principle of consolidated supervision in regulating
banks, and approximately 45% do not have an independent bank
regulator.394 Offshore financial centers have been of particular con-
cern. In fact, the IMF, in conducting the FSAP, has given priority to
assessing forty-four offshore financial centers.3 95 As of March 2004,
the IMF has completed its assessment of forty-two of these forty-
four.396 Compliance with international financial standards among
these offshore financial centers tended to increase with income per
capita.3 97 According to the IMF, about 40% of the offshore financial
centers need to strengthen the bank supervisors' independence, the
supervisors' available resources, and their ability to conduct onsite
and offsite examinations of banks.398
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CORE PRINCIPLES
As discussed above, the Core Principles, like nearly all interna-
tional financial standards, are "soft law." 99 They are not treaties en-
392 ESTANDARDS FORUM WEEKLY REPORT, supra note 296, at 11.
393 See e.g.,JosephJ. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International
Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market Partnership, 16 ANN.
REv. BANKING L. 227, 240-41 (1997) (noting the failures of the Barings Bank and the New
York branch of Daiwa Bank).
394 Agustin Carstens, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Opportunity for Emerging and
Developing Countries in International Standard Setting: An IMF Perspective, Address
Before the Fourth Annual IMF/World Bank/Federal Reserve Seminar (June 2, 2004),
available at http://www.irf.org/external/np/speeches/20O4/060204a.htm.
3" See generally IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM-AN
UPDATE (2004) (discussing the assessment of the offshore financial centers), available at
http://www.imf.org.
396 Id. at 6.
397 Id. at 7.
398 Id. at 8.
399 Soft law means "[gluidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set stan-
dards of conduct but are not legally binding." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1397 (8th ed.
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forceable under international law. The members of the Basel Com-
mittee did not intend to create a treaty and did not negotiate the
Core Principles as a treaty.
Developing international financial standards as soft law has some
advantages. This type of law is flexible and allows the parties to con-
sider specific national conditions or attributes in implementing the
standards. For instance, the Core Principles are sensitive to the fact
that bank regulatory structures differ greatly among nations. The
United Kingdom has a single regulator-the Financial Services
Authority-for the entire financial sector.400 The United States has
several bank regulators at the federal level-the Federal Reserve, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC-and numerous bank
regulators at the state level. 401 The Core Principles do not require a
specific regulatory structure for compliance. They allow nations to
maintain their current structure as long as certain underlying princi-
ples, such as independence of the regulator, adequate funding, and
adequate staffing, are met.40 2 As a practical matter, requiring a specific
regulatory structure would be virtually impossible because the reor-
ganization of regulatory agencies typically requires legislation that
likely is not within the power of bank regulators alone.40s
Another advantage that non-binding standards provide is the
relative ease with which countries reach agreement on them. The na-
tions recognize the non-binding nature of the agreement and thus
tend to be more inclined to accept their substantive standards.
Finally, soft law is particularly effective in industries characterized
by rapid change, such as the financial services sector, where im-
provements in technology and communications allow for new
financial products and new methods of delivering financial services.
Nevertheless, soft law also has its disadvantages. This type of law is
not directly enforceable by a court or any other judicial authority or
tribunal.40 4 No court or other legal authority would use the standard
as a basis for legal action because the parties never intended to enter
into an enforceable agreement.
2004). See generally Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Hard Law v. Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichot-
omy, 35 INT'L LAW. 1433 (2001) (questioning whether there is a functional difference be-
tween the two categories of international law).
i0 See supra notes 278-296 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 364-392 and accompanying text.
402 SeeCoRE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 13-14.
403 Id. at 3.
404 See Ho, supra note 248, at 648 n.2.
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Furthermore, because the agreements are not legally enforce-
able, nations can vary in their own interpretation and implementation
of the standards. No central authority mandates a particular interpre-
tation; therefore, nations can implement the standards with greater
flexibility. For example, the recently announced Revised Capital Ac-
cord is intended to apply only to internationally active banks, yet the
Basel Committee has never specifically defined what constitutes an
"internationally active bank."405 The United States has stated that the
provisions of the Revised Capital Accord will only apply to interna-
tionally active banks (probably the largest thirty or so banks in the
United States). 40 6 In contrast, the EU is planning to enact a directive
that requires all banks within the EU to meet the capital requirements
under the Revised Capital Accord. 4 7 Thus, the EU and the United
States have interpreted the applicability of the Revised Capital Accord
in divergent manners.
Traditionally, the Basel Committee has relied on peer pressure
among its members to enforce its standards, including the Core Prin-
ciples. Bank regulators that freely agree to standards and fail to im-
plement them will likely suffer a loss of reputation within the Com-
mittee.408 Given the Basel Committee's constant activity reviewing
financial supervisory practices around the world, a failure to imple-
ment a standard in good faith would likely weaken a nation's position
with respect to future negotiations on new or revised standards.
A. Financial Sector Assessment Program
The IMF and the World Bank have taken on the role of assessing
nations' compliance with international financial standards.4°9 The
IMF has identified twelve key standards, one of which is the Core
405 REvISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 1.
406 Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities: Quantitative Impact Study, 69
Fed. Reg. 50, 442 (Aug. 16, 2004); see Roger W. Ferguson, Vice Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, Back to the Future in Managing Banking Risk, Speech at Washington and
Lee University (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2002/200203042/default.htm.
407 See Re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 20 March 2000 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Insti-
tutions and Council Directive 93/6/EC of 15 March 1993 on the Capital Adequacy of In-
vestment Firms and Credit Institutions, COM(2004) 4-86.
408 Andrew T. Gruzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 10 CAL. L. REv.
1823, 1881 (2002).
409 See generally IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM-REvIEW, LESSONS, AND
ISSUES GOING FORWARD (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.inff.org/external/np/
fsap/2003/review.pdf (describing the successes and failures of the program).
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Principles, as benchmarks of its assessment program.410 In the late
1990s, the IMF organized an assessment program that focused solely
on a nation's implementation of these standards. 411 The IMF and the
World Bank typically send a team of experienced bank supervisors to
a nation to evaluate the nation's compliance with these standards.
The IMF then issues its findings from this inspection in documents
entitled Reports on Standards and Codes ("ROSC").412
Subsequently, in 1999, with the cooperation of the World Bank,
the IMF expanded and strengthened the ROSC program by creating
the FSAP.413 The FSAP takes a broader assessment of the overall
financial stability and soundness of a nation's financial system and
reviews the nation's fiscal and monetary policies. 414 A component of
this assessment is a review of the implementation of the twelve key
standards, 415 and, in determining the level of complaince with these
standards, the FSAP team compares both the letter of the law and ac-
tual practice.416
The IMF publishes the FSAP reports and the ROSC on a particu-
lar country only if that country agrees to publication. 417 Publication of
these reports is needed to increase transparency of bank regulatory
systems and improve market discipline. Unfortunately, countries do
not always consent. In the report on the forty-two offshore financial
centers, only twenty-two of the jurisdictions had consented to publica-
tion of the FSAP report as of April 2004.418
In 2003, the IMF Board considered instituting a policy of publish-
ing all FSAP reports but decided to maintain its current policy of pub-
lishing these reports only with the permission of the nation as-
4 10 IMF, supra note 285.
41 See IMF, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter IMF ROSC
Reports]. One of the first ROSC reports, dated March 15, 1999, focused on the United
Kingdom and its compliance with the Core Principles, the Data Dissemination Standards,
and the Fiscal Transparency Standard. IMF, Experimental Report on Transparency Practices:
United Kingdom, at http://www.inif.org/external/np/rosc/gbr/ (Mar. 15, 1999).
412 IMF ROSC Reports, supra note 411; see WEBER, supra note 17.
41 IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), at http://www.inif.org/external/np/
fsap/fsap.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
414 Id.
415 See IMF, supra note 285.
416 See Paul Hilbers, The IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program, at http://
www.in.org/external/np/vc/2001/022301.htm (Feb. 2001).
417 IMF, supra note 409, at 29.
41 Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, FSF Reviews Its Offshore Financial Centers
Initiative, at bttp://www.fsforum.org/press/OFC-pressrelease.pdf (Apr. 5, 2004).
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sessed. 419 Nevertheless, the IMF did agree to publish the annual Arti-
cle IV surveillance reports of each member nation beginning July 1,
2004.420 Article IV surveillance refers to reviews of member nations'
foreign exchange policies, as required by Article IV of the IMF Arti-
cles of Agreement. 421 In recent years, these surveillance reports have
expanded into an overall review of the monetary policy, fiscal policy,
and financial services sector of a particular nation. In the past, the
IMF only published the Article IV reports with the permission of the
nation assessed. 422
Publication of the FSAP reports and the ROSCs improves the
transparency of national regulatory practices and the soundness of na-
tional financial systems. The IMF and World Bank encourage publica-
tion of these reports, 423 as do other standard-setting bodies, such as the
Financial Stability Forum.424 A refusal to agree to the publication of the
report by the assessed country may indicate serious non-compliance
with the standards. Presumably, a jurisdiction complying with the Core
Principles and other standards, or making good progress in compliance
with the standards, would want to advertise that fact.
Credit rating agencies, such as Fitch Ratings and Standard and
Poor's, review the publicly available reports on compliance with stan-
dards when determining a country's sovereign rating.425 Compliance
with international financial standards is a positive factor in rating a
nation's ability to repay its debt.426 A better credit rating typically re-
duces the interest rate that a country must pay on its sovereign debt.
This reduction in the interest rate and, thus, borrowing costs, pro-
vides an incentive for nations to comply with standards and to agree
to publish the independent assessment of the IMF.
419 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, ONGOING AND RECENT WORK RELEVANT TO SOUND FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS 7 (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/Finalpost31
MarchRevision.pdf.
420 Id.
421 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 48.
422 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 419, at 29.
423 IMF, IMF Reviews Experience with Financial Sector Assessment Program and Reaches
Conclusions on Issues Going Forward, at http://www.imnf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/
pn0346.htm (Apr. 4, 2003).
424 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 419, at 7.
425 See Chambers, supra note 245; Fox, supra note 245.
426 Fox, supra note 245.
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For example, emerging market countries' compliance with these
standards is linked to higher credit ratings and lower spreads. 427 After
examining data on ratings and spreads from twenty-nine countries,
researchers at the IMF concluded:
Our findings suggest that improved adherence to standards,
and the higher ratings that result, could help a country miti-
gate the impact of an external crisis by supporting continued
access to external borrowing. Adherence can help prevent cri-
ses by reducing spreads and helping the authorities remain
solvent in cases it otherwise might not have remained sol-
vent.4
28
Other IMF reports likewise confirm that compliance with interna-
tional financial standards improves sovereign credit ratings and de-
creases borrowing costs.42
B. Revised Capital Accord
The Revised Capital Accord provides another opportunity to en-
force the Core Principles. Pillar I of the Revised Capital Accord
defines methods for calculating the minimum required capital for
banks.430 Under the standardized method described in Pillar I, banks
may use the ratings by external credit assessment agencies to calculate
risk weights for sovereign debt and for debt owed by corporations and
banks.431 The higher the sovereign rating, the lower the risk weight
and the lower the amount of capital allocated to that particular
credit.43 2 The credit rating agencies consider compliance with inter-
national financial standards, including the Core Principles, in deter-
427 See Christopher Christofides et al., The Link Between Adherence to International
Standards of Good Practice, Foreign Exchange Spreads and Ratings 26 (IMF Working Paper
WP/03/74, Apr. 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wpO374.
pd-
428 See id.
42 See IMF & WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: STRENGTHENING SURVEIL-
LANCE, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 13 (Mar. 5, 2003), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2003/030503.pdf; Rachel Glennerster &
Yongseok Kim, Is Transparency Good for You, and Can the IMF Help? (IMF Working Pa-
per WP/03/132, 2003), available at http://www.inf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/
wp03132.pdf.
430 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 12-14.
431 Id. at 23-26.
432 See id. at 12-14.
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mining ratings. 433 Rating agencies review and evaluate ROSCs and
FSAP reports, among other sources of information, in determining
sovereign ratings. 434 By complying with international financial stan-
dards, national governments make their debt, and loans to corporate
borrowers in that nation, more attractive to international banks, be-
cause those banks can allocate less capital to those loans and, there-
fore, increase their profit margins on the loans.
The standardized method also allows banks to consider export
credit insurance ratings in determining risk weights. 435 Export credit
insurance provides coverage in the event that a nation prevents pay-
ments for exports. 436 The insurance premium is dependent on many
factors, one of which is the stability of the nation's financial and po-
litical system. 437 In calculating insurance premiums, export credit in-
surance agencies consider a nation's compliance with international
financial standards, including the Core Principles, and will review any
available ROSCs or FSAP reports. 438
Thus, the provisions of the Revised Capital Accord provide an
incentive for nations to implement the Core Principles. Full imple-
mentation of the Core Principles will lower borrowing costs for coun-
tries, and the borrowers located therein, and reduce the export credit
insurance premiums that exporters will pay for coverage. Banks and
international businesses therefore have an incentive to exert political
pressure on governments to comply with these international financial
standards in order to reduce these costs of doing business. Interna-
tional banks and businesses will focus their operations on countries
that have complied with international financial standards in order to
lower their interest payments on loans and export credit insurance
premiums, respectively.
One weakness of reliance on sovereign ratings, however, is that
rating agencies do not necessarily analyze all nations. Fitch Ratings is-
sued sovereign ratings for approximately ninety countries in 2004.439
433 Chambers, supra note 245; George Vojta & Carl Adams, A Big Boost for Business from
Pricing Local Risks: International Standards for Assessing Country Risk, 85 RMAJ. 22, 23 (2003).
434 Chambers, supra note 245.
435 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 15-16.
436 See Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Export Credit Insurance, at http://www.
exim.gov/products/insurance/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
437 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE U.S., SHORT-TERM CREDIT STANDARDS 18-19 tbls.
D (3)-D (4) (2001), available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/eib99-09.pdf.
438 See id. at 22-24.
439 FITCH RATINGS, COMPLETE SOVEREIGN RATING HISTORY (July 21, 2004), available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/shared/sovereign-ratings-history.pdf.
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Moody's and Standard and Poor's analyzed approximately 100 coun-
tries each.44 The IMF currently has 184 member nations.441 Thus, ap-
proximately seventy jurisdictions are not currently rated by one of these
three major credit rating agencies.442 The largest and most important
countries are rated (sometimes by all three agencies), but some less
developed nations are not rated and therefore will be unable to take
advantage of the lower risk weight categories. The Revised Capital Ac-
cord places loans to non-rated countries in the 100% risk weight cate-
gory.443 Nevertheless, credit rating agencies will likely expand their cov-
erage in the near future, so unrated nations obviously have an incentive
to encourage agencies to evaluate them for a rating.444
The second pillar of the Revised Capital Accord focuses on the
prudential supervision of a bank's risk management methods. 445 Pillar
I refers to the Core Principles as part of the overall supervisory proc-
ess, and states that the Revised Capital Accord complements "the ex-
tensive supervisory guidance" in the Core Principles and the Method-
ology.446 In other words, a review of capital adequacy is not a stand-
alone process, but is part of the overall supervision of banks. Bank
supervisors should apply other supervisory guidance issued by the
Basel Committee in addition to the minimum capital adequacy levels
of the Revised Capital Accord.447
C. IMF and World Bank Loan Conditions
Conditionality of loans by the IMF and the World Bank provides
another enforcement mechanism for the Core Principles. After the
440 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, SOVEREIGN RATINGS LIST (July 23, 2004), available at
http://www.moodys.com; STANDARD & POOR'S, SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS (July 27,
2004), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com.
441 IMF, The IMF at a Glance, at http://www.inif.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.
htn (Sept. 2004).
442 The author analyzed the country lists of the four credit rating agencies: Standard
and Poor's, Moody's, Fitch Ratings, and Capital Intelligence, a ratings agency based in
Cyprus with its website at http://www.ciratings.com (last visited May 4, 2005).
443 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 15.
" See Vojta & Adams, supra note 433, at 26. EStandards Forum is planning to increase
its monitoring and ratings to included 180 countries. Id.
445 See REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 158-74; Heimann, supra note 192,
at 68; Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, The Evolution of Bank Supervi-
sion, Remarks Before the American Bankers Association (Oct. 11, 1999), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991011 .htm.
446 REVISED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 159-74. Principle 6 of the Core
Principles refers to minimum capital levels for banks. See CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15,
at 4-5.
447 See REVISTED CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 48, at 174.
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Mexican financial crisis in 1994, the IMF and its member nations cre-
ated a special lending facility for use by nations in financial distress-
the New Arrangements to Borrow ("NAB").448 Under this new facility,
the IMF can issue loans to provide liquidity to national economies.449
One of the conditions of lending from any of the IMF loan facilities,
including the NAB, is compliance with international financial stan-
dards or an agreement to implement such standards.450 One objective
behind the IMF loan program is to improve the operation of national
financial sectors, one aspect of which is compliance with international
financial standards. 451 Of course, a weakness of this enforcement
method is that compliance is obtained only after a crisis occurs. Ide-
ally, countries should comply with international standards in an effort
to prevent such financial crises in the first place.
IV. NEXT STEPS
The enforcement capabilities of the Core Principles have im-
proved since the 1980s. While enforcement of the Core Principles does
not approach the level of enforcement available with binding interna-
tional treaties, significant improvements in enforcement mechanisms
have been made.
What are the next steps in international bank regulation and su-
pervisory cooperation? As the chart in Appendix A and the discussion
above show, the history of the Basel Committee standards indicates
that standards are developed and then improved in incremental steps.
The Basel Committee has typically reacted to bank and financial crises
by amending and improving international standards. It has not issued
standards in a proactive attempt to anticipate weaknesses in the inter-
national financial system.
This reactive approach to standard setting has resulted in stan-
dards that are increasingly detailed in their language, while at the
same time increasingly broad in their scope. The Basel Committee
448 See Press Release No. 98/57, IMF, New Arrangements to Borrow Enter Into Force
(Nov. 19, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9857.htm.
449 See id.
450 See generally IMF, Factsheet-IMF Conditionality, at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/conditio.htm (Sep. 2004).
451 See, e.g., IMF, Serbia and Montenegro-Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Eco-
nomic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding-Serbia and
Montenegro, May 21, 2004, available at http://www.inf.org/External/NP/LOI/2004/scg/
01/index.htm; IMF, Nicaragua-Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Finan-
cial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, Dec. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/nic/02/index.htm.
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initially issued standards related only to the cooperation of supervi-
sors in cross-border banking. Since the Concordat, however, the stan-
dards have become steadily more detailed. Then, at the urging of the
G-7, the Basel Committee issued broad standards for the entire bank
supervisory system, not just for the international coordination of bank
supervision, with the Core Principles in 1997.
With regard to capital adequacy, the Basel Committee issued the
original Capital Accord in 1988. This accord set substantive minimum
capital levels, marking the first time that bank regulators had ever
agreed on such a standard. The Revised Capital Accord, issued in
June 2004, further develops and revises these standards on minimum
capital adequacy.
Given the Basel Committee's history, incremental change and im-
provement to the standards will likely continue to be the trend in the
development of international bank regulation. Nations tend to be cau-
tious about regulating their financial sectors because of the importance
of financial institutions to national economies, especially in emerging
markets. Agreeing to an international standard potentially means a loss
of national sovereignty, something to which nations are generally very
reluctant to concede. Nevertheless, broader and more detailed interna-
tional standards will be the norm, if for no other reason than improved
technology will further increase trade in financial services, pushing na-
tions to revise and expand international financial standards in order to
improve the stability of an increasingly global financial system.
Is an international treaty on banking regulation likely in the next
decade? While the possibility cannot be ruled out, agreement on a
treaty is unlikely in the near future. 452 The international financial sys-
tem changes quickly as new products are introduced and new markets
develop. Treaties are viewed as too rigid to accommodate these rapid
changes. 45  In addition, in the event of a financial crisis, bank supervi-
sors desire flexibility to craft a solution to the crisis and fear that a
treaty may unexpectedly and unduly restrict their responsiveness. 45 4
45 2 Jonathan Sedlak, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or Contractual So-
lution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1496-97 (2004). See generally ANNE KRUEGER, A NEW AP-
PROACH To SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1-5 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf (explaining how the Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing Mechanism, a treaty-based framework proposed by the IMF, was never agreed
upon).
453 BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE:
A PRACTICAL POsT-ASIA AGENDA 30-35 (1999).
4-4 WilliamJ. McDonough, Remarks Before the 11th International Conference of Bank Super-
visors, 1215 PLI CORP. L. & PRAC. 299, 301-05 (2000).
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Nevertheless, a treaty does have numerous enforcement mechanisms
that are not available with voluntary international standards.
In 1998, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, pro-
posed a new international body to improve stability in the interna-
tional financial system. 455 This agency would combine the responsibili-
ties of the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, and the World
Bank.456 The idea went nowhere. No supranational body regulating
the international financial system is likely in the near future because
of nations' concerns regarding a loss of sovereignty.457 The EU, in im-
plementing its Financial Services Action Plan and the Lamfalussy Pro-
cess, is approaching the creation of a supranational regulator of
financial services. Even there, member states and the European Par-
liament are setting limits on the extent of convergence. 45 8 Under the
EU's founding documents, the member states have transferred their
sovereign power in certain areas to the EU, but not the prudential
supervision of banks and credit institutions. 459
Many commentators applaud the establishment of the Financial
Stability Forum and expect it to become more prominent in the
financial regulatory arena.40 The goal of the Financial Stability Fo-
rum is to coordinate the international regulation of the banking, in-
surance, and securities sectors as financial institutions frequently pro-
vide all three types of services. 46 1 Regulators are often organized along
sectoral lines and therefore do not easily cooperate in the supervision
of complex financial institutions that operate in all three lines of
business. As these institutions increasingly offer all types of financial
services in such an integrated manner, sectoral supervision is begin-
ning to make less sense. The consolidated supervision of these com-
plex financial institutions becomes more difficult and can place ex-
cessive regulatory costs on financial institutions that have to prepare
and file multiple reports with several different regulatory agencies.
455 Tony Blair, The International Economic Crisis: The Urgent Need for an International
Response (Oct. 7, 1998), available at http:/www.number-IO.gov.uk/output/pageS.asp.
456 Id.
457 Barry Eichengreen, Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We
Stand?, 17 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 175, 176 (2000).
458 See Randzio-Plath, supra note 264, at 10.
459 EC TREATY, supra note 249, art. 105(5)-(6).
460Jason Liberi, Note, The Financial Stability Forum: A Step in the Right Direction... Not
FarEnough, 24 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 549, 574-75 (2003); DAVIES, supra note 35.
461 Fin. Stability Forum, What We Do, at http://www.fsforum.org/about/what-wedo.
html (last updated Dec. 13, 2004).
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Emerging markets, such as India, China, and certain Latin Ameri-
can countries, will likely continue to become more involved in the Basel
Committee process. Emerging market countries made a significant
contribution to the Basel Committee's Core Principles462 and have con-
tinued to contribute to Basel Committee activities. The central banks
from certain emerging markets, such as China and India, joined the
Bank for International Settlements in 1996.463 As emerging markets
become more important in the international financial system, their in-
volvement and influence in the Basel process will undoubtedly grow. In
1948, the developed nations (North America, Western Europe, and Ja-
pan) accounted for 58.8% of merchandise world trade, while emerging
markets accounted for 6.9% of merchandise world trade.464 In 2002,
the developed nations' percentage of world trade was 64.1%, while the
emerging markets' percentage had increased to 9.5%465 In 1985, banks
located in the G-7 nations accounted for 79.5% of all outstanding loans
in the world. In 2003, the G-7 banks accounted for 61.5%-an 18% de-
crease.46 6 Although the G-7 banks predominate international lending,
other banks, including those from emerging markets, are gaining mar-
ket share. Over the long run, emerging markets will very likely increase
their share of international lending and world trade, gaining commen-
surate influence in the Basel Committee process. As stakeholders in
this process, emerging markets will thus be more likely to implement
the Core Principles and other international financial standards on a
consistent basis.
CONCLUSION
The Core Principles have generally been a success in the devel-
oped world. They represent a logical evolution and expansion of the
Basel Committee's activities in light of the globalization of world
financial markets. The Basel Committee has involved regulators from
the emerging markets more extensively in the past decade, but the
Core Principles have thus far not been implemented as consistently in
462 CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1-2.
463 Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Invites Nine New Members to Join It
(Sept. 9, 1996), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p9609096.htm. The BIS provides
staff support to the Basel Committee.
46 WTO, International Trade Statistics, II. Selected Long Term Trends (2003), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statis_e/its2003_e/its2OO3_e.pdf.
465 Id.
46 Bank for Int'l Settlements, International Banking Statistics 52, tbl.8A (June 2004),
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.
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emerging markets. Soft law is currently the principal approach to har-
monize bank regulation and supervisory practices (at least outside of
the EU). The surveillance of international financial standards compli-
ance by the IMF and the World Bank represents a new enforcement
technique for the Core Principles and other key international financial
standards. The Revised Capital Accord itself reinforces the enforce-
ment of the Core Principles. The world undoubtedly will experience
additional financial crises in the future. The cooperation and trust
among bank supervisors engendered by the process of negotiating the
Core Principles, the Revised Capital Accord, and other international
banking standards will increase the likelihood of an effective resolution
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